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**From Elections to Stalemate:
The Making of the Sarajevo Siege, 1990-1994**

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Abbreviations

ARBiH	Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (<i>Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine</i>)
BCS	Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina (<i>Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina</i>)
ECCY	European Community Conference on Yugoslavia
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union (<i>Hrvatska demokratska zajednica</i>)
HVO	Croat Defense Council (<i>Hrvatsko vijeće obrane</i>)
ICFY	International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army (<i>Jugoslovenska narodna armija</i>)
MUP	Ministry of Internal Affairs (<i>Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova</i>)
SAO	Serb Autonomous Region (<i>Srpska autonomna oblast</i>)
SDA	Party of Democratic Action (<i>Stranka demokratske akcije</i>) (largest Bosnian Muslim nationalist party)
SDS	Serb Democratic Party (<i>Srpska demokratska stranka</i>)
SFRJ	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (<i>Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija</i>)
TO	Territorial Defense (<i>Teritorijalna odbrana</i>)
VOPP	Vance-Owen Peace Plan
VRS	Army of Republika Srpska (<i>Vojska Republike Srpske</i>)
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force

Introduction

This report provides historical background and political and military context for events alleged in the indictment in ICTY Case IT-98-29/1, the Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević. My account centers on developments from November 1990 (when multiparty elections brought nationalists to power) to August 1994, the beginning of the period covered in the indictment of General Milošević. I venture outside those chronological confines only to provide background on collective and individual actors who played major roles in events after 1990. I have divided the account into 9 topics (see “Contents”), including this introduction and a conclusion, while presenting events chronologically insofar as possible consistent with topical organization.

The report was prepared based on materials in the research library of the University of Michigan, the author’s personal library, documents made available by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, and certain documents admitted into evidence in previous cases by Trial Chambers of the ICTY. I have also drawn on my recently-published history of the city, *Sarajevo: A Biography* (London, Hurst and Co; and Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006).

Endnotes contain source citations, the original BCS text (when available) of quotes used in the body of the report, definitions of certain terms, and explanatory information. I have used English translations prepared by ICTY translators when I could find them; in other cases, the translations are mine. Abbreviations used in the text are identified in bold type upon first mention. Appendix A consists of the author’s Curriculum Vitae. Appendix B contains the tables referenced in the narrative, and Appendix C is made up of maps.

Peoples and Nationalism: Sarajevo and the Multiparty Elections of 1990

As communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1990, multiparty democratic elections were held throughout the region. In the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (**SFRJ** – *Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija*), country-wide elections were never called, but communist-dominated assemblies in each of the country's six republics scheduled multiparty elections on different dates throughout 1990. Voting first took place in the republics of Croatia and Slovenia in April and May 1990, and elections in other republics followed in November and December 1990. In the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina*, hereafter abbreviated **BiH**), three nationalist parties swept to victory in elections in November 1990, defeating dozens of other parties that had been founded and registered in the preceding months.¹ Each of the three major nationalist parties drew support almost exclusively from members of a single “nation” in BiH.² The Serb Democratic Party (**SDS** – *Srpska demokratska stranka*) won the votes of most Serbs; the Croat Democratic Community (**HDZ** – *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*) won support from most Croats; and the Party for Democratic Action (**SDA** – *Stranka demokratske akcije*) was supported by Bosnian Muslims, whose leaders adopted the name “Bosniak” for their nation in 1993. The three nationalist parties that prevailed in 1990 continued to lead their respective nations in BiH through the war (1992-1995) and post-war period, until all three lost their leading positions to other nationalist parties in the elections of October 2006.

The Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims of BiH all originated in the migrations of Slavs to Southeastern Europe in the fifth through eighth centuries A.D. They spoke Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian (abbreviated **BCS**), officially recognized today as three languages that are very close to one another and wholly mutually intelligible – so close that through most of the twentieth century they were commonly considered a single language called Serbo-Croatian.³ (One recent study described BCS as “the common core underlying Bosnian Croatian and Serbian” and

concluded that “the language is simultaneously one and more than one.”⁴) Members of each group hold to religious tradition as a key element that distinguishes them from other groups: Serbs look to the Serbian Orthodox faith, Croats to Catholicism, and Bosnian Muslims to Islam. Through “national awakenings” that took place from the late eighteenth to the latter half of the twentieth centuries, members of each religious community adopted secular national identities and developed political programs under secular leaders.⁵ In the twentieth century, many members of each group abjured participation in organized religion while retaining (and in some cases strengthening) their national identity. Thus in BiH one sees the apparent paradox of three primary nations that are distinguished by religious affiliation and tradition but whose members are largely secular in politics and practice.

According to the 1991 census, members of all three groups were residentially dispersed throughout most of BiH. In rural areas, many lived in single-nation villages, but those villages were often adjacent or close to settlements of other nations. Except for a few areas of BiH, it was simply impossible to draw boundaries on a map defining contiguous territory inhabited only by members of a single national group. Furthermore, none of the three major groups was confined to BiH alone. More Croats and Serbs lived in neighboring republics than in BiH. The majority of Croats lived in the adjacent Republic of Croatia; most Serbs lived in the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, and another 600,000 Serbs lived in the Republic of Croatia. The majority of Bosnian Muslims lived in BiH, but a significant number also resided (and reside today) in the Sandžak area southeast of BiH that straddles the boundary between the Republics of Montenegro and Serbia.

Sarajevo, BiH’s capital and largest city, epitomized the republic’s diversity. Human settlements date back to pre-Roman times in the valley where Sarajevo is located, and the area has been continuously inhabited since then, but the urban center in its present location was developed primarily by officials of the Ottoman Empire in the mid 1400s. Sarajevo grew the most under three different administrations: Ottoman (mainly 1460 to 1600), Austro-Hungarian (1878-1918), and communist Yugoslav (1945-1990). From fewer than 100,000 inhabitants in 1945, the city grew to over half a million residents by 1990. Based in a narrow east-west valley

astride the Miljacka River that widens at its western end, Sarajevo by 1990 had spread several kilometers westward onto the large flatland known as the Sarajevo Plain and upward into the hills surrounding the Ottoman-era city. But growth of the city's urban core was outpaced by even greater political expansion as the city anticipated further growth. As shown in Map One, the city consisted of ten municipalities in 1990. Six municipalities – Stari grad (Old Town), Centar (Center), Novo Sarajevo (New Sarajevo), Novi grad (New City), Vogošća and Ilidža – had either been part of the city for centuries or had been urbanized during the twentieth century. The remaining four municipalities – Pale, Ilijaš, Hadžići and Trnovo – had been incorporated into the city in 1977. These four peripheral municipalities consisted largely of rural, mountainous terrain and were more sparsely populated than the urban core. Taken together, the peripheral municipalities in 1991 accounted for three quarters of the city's territory but only 13.8% of its population.⁶ The outlying municipalities had also grown more slowly than those making up the core urban municipalities. From 1981 to 1991, their total population increased from 68,911 to 72,730, but their percent of Sarajevo's total population fell from 15.4% to 13.8% as the rest of the city grew at a faster rate.

The city of Sarajevo was largely residentially integrated in 1990. It was home to a flourishing "common life," to use the socialist-era term for the phenomenon that after 1991 became more widely known as "multiethnic life."⁷ By 1990 the urbanized center had become ethnically mixed, and many more Sarajevans lived in high-rise apartment buildings without regard to national identity. Members of various nations mingled freely in everyday affairs, honored one another with mutual visits on appropriate holidays, and expressed their closeness to those of other nations in regarding them as "komšije" (neighbors). Sarajevans' common life was highlighted by their shared pride in hosting the 14th Olympic Winter Games in 1984.

Bosnian Muslims accounted for 49.2% of Sarajevo's inhabitants, a slightly higher percent than in the entire republic (43.5%). In Sarajevo, the percent of Serbs was slightly lower than in BiH as a whole (29.8% v. 31.4% in the republic), and the percent of Croats considerably lower (6.6% v. 17.3% in the republic). A disproportionate percentage of Sarajevans (10.7% v. 5.5% in

the republic) called themselves “Yugoslavs,” either from a primary loyalty to the federal state or to escape identifying with one of the major peoples.

Sarajevo’s four peripheral municipalities differed in several respects from the profile of the city as a whole. Compared to all of Sarajevo, the peripheral municipalities had a somewhat higher Serb population and lower percentages of Croats and Yugoslavs, while the Muslims’ percent of the population was nearly the same (see Table One). Each of the four peripheral municipalities contained mono-ethnic rural villages, although that homogeneity had been diluted somewhat by new construction, particularly of weekend and summer homes called *vikendicas* built by urban Sarajevans of all nations. As shown on Map Two, Serb-majority villages were clustered in areas east of downtown in the mountainous municipality of Pale and northwest of downtown in Ilijaš, as well as in small areas of other municipalities. The municipality of Trnovo, on the other hand, consisted largely of Muslim-majority villages. In the early 1990s, areas of those clustered Serb villages would prove hospitable to Serb nationalists and become centers of Serb political, economic, and military activities.

Voters in Sarajevo, like elsewhere in BiH, opted mainly for nationalist parties in the 1990 election, but the percentage of ballots cast in the city for non-nationalist candidates was higher than in the republic as a whole. Table Two shows that the three nationalist parties combined won well over 50% of seats in Sarajevo’s city council, but it also shows that the two major multiethnic parties, the Social Democrats and Reformists, fared better in Sarajevo than in the republic as a whole. Nationalist parties, either alone or in partnership, also won a majority of seats in the assemblies of all but one of the city’s ten constituent municipalities. The SDS won an absolute majority (32 out of 50 seats) in the assembly of the predominantly Serb municipality of Pale, while the SDA won an absolute majority in the largely Muslim municipality of Trnovo (19 of 30 seats) and in the city center municipality of Stari grad (37 of 70 seats). Only in the fast-growing, newly-developed municipality of Novo Sarajevo did non-nationalists come close to victory, winning 49 seats compared to 51 by the nationalists. Novo Sarajevo, crowded with many high-rise apartment complexes, was home to many beneficiaries of socialist-era urbanization who feared that victorious nationalists might heighten divisions in the republic.⁸

But in Novo Sarajevo and elsewhere, the nationalists succeeded in persuading a small or large majority of voters that they could work together in partnership if they came to power.⁹ After the election, pursuant to formulas agreed upon beforehand, leaders of the HDZ, SDA, and SDS divided key positions among themselves at the republic and municipal levels and in the Sarajevo city government while wholly excluding non-nationalist Social Democrats and Reformists from any role in government.¹⁰

Sarajevo's newly-elected officials faced formidable challenges. The SFRJ as a whole suffered from interlinked crises of economic stagnation, inflation, and political fragmentation that may be traced to the 1970s or earlier. The 1974 constitution endowed the country's six republics and two autonomous provinces with considerable autonomy, and leaders in those republics held widely divergent views on how best to organize or re-organize the federal state. One observer divided these opinions into two contending camps: the "separatist" nationalists (principally Croats, Slovenes, and Albanians of Kosovo) and "hegemonist" nationalists (led by Slobodan Milošević, president of the Republic of Serbia).¹¹ The "separatists" wanted greater autonomy or independence from the SFRJ; "hegemonists" wanted to strengthen the federal state or preserve the status quo. Caught in the middle were the leaders of BiH, particularly the Bosnian Muslims, who valued being part of Yugoslavia yet feared being left in a diminished SFRJ dominated by Serbia.

In addition to being at the center of the political rift in the SFRJ, the Sarajevo city government was plagued by squabbles among local political leaders from the ten municipalities that made up the city. In the first few post-election months, the municipal leaders' differences centered on the allocation of the city's financial resources and had little to do with nationalism. Sarajevo Mayor Muhamed Kreševljaković, upon assuming office on 20 December 1990, defined his greatest challenge as preserving the city's unity:

Sarajevo is in an unenviable political position right now, with many communal problems. It obviously does not live as a united urban whole, because it consists of many municipalities, and that is divisive.¹²

By May 1991, Kreševljaković and his city government faced a systematic campaign by the SDS to remove individual municipalities from the jurisdiction of the city of Sarajevo. In the course of that campaign, disputes among municipalities about budgetary allocations were superseded by rival nationalist visions of the city's future, with most SDS members supporting the separation of Serb-inhabited areas from the city's jurisdiction while SDA and HDZ leaders supported its continued unity.

The SDS Campaign for Regionalization

Shortly after their electoral triumph in November 1990, SDS leaders launched a campaign to secure control over all areas of BiH where Serbs lived, thereby challenging the jurisdiction of the republic's government. SDS party chiefs referred to their campaign as "regionalization." In the campaign's first stage in April and May 1991, SDS party leaders promoted regional "communities of municipalities" in areas where their party had won electoral control of municipal assemblies. Although the SDS leaders invited all municipalities to join, only SDS-led municipal assemblies accepted, resulting in SDS-led communities of SDS-controlled municipalities. In April 1991 SDS leaders formally declared the first Serb-led regional body, the Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina (*Zajednica opština Bosanske Krajine*), in northwestern BiH.¹³ A few days later, the campaign expanded to Pale, the Sarajevo municipality with the highest percent of Serb inhabitants and of SDS municipal assembly delegates. SDS delegates in Pale's municipal assembly of Pale announced their intention to secede from the city of Sarajevo.¹⁴ Their announcement initiated the SDS effort to remove Serb-inhabited administrative units from the city's jurisdiction.

In their regionalization campaign, SDS leaders in BiH drew upon strategies and institutions developed by the Serb Democratic Party in Croatia, from which the SDS of BiH took its name. After faring poorly in elections in spring 1990 among the approximately 600,000 Serbs living in Croatia, the SDS in Croatia led a movement in Serb-majority areas to resist the jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia. Led by former dissident Franjo Tudjman, Croatian nationalists had won control of the republic's central institutions in the 1990 elections, so the

SDS-led movement pitted Serb nationalists against Croat nationalists who wanted their republic to have greater autonomy or independence from the federal polity. On 27 June 1990, Serbs in Croatia formed the “Community of Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika,” one of several single-national local and regional associations within which Serbs challenged the jurisdiction of the Croatian government.¹⁵ With the political support of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the military participation of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA – *Jugoslovenska narodna armija*), Serb nationalists took up arms to carve out Serb-inhabited territories from the Republic of Croatia, leading to bloody war with Croatian security forces in the latter half of 1991. The JNA drew heavily upon mobilized reservists from BiH to fight the war, and Milošević personally directed leaders of the SDS in BiH to make sure the JNA met its quotas for reservists.¹⁶ Despite the surprising effectiveness of Croatia’s armed forces, the JNA and Croatia’s breakaway Serbs successfully created several Serb-dominated territories in Croatia. In December 1991 they combined their regional associations and proclaimed a single Serb state, the Republic of Serbian Krajina (*Republika Srpske Krajine*), within the boundaries of the Republic of Croatia.¹⁷

Following the precedent of the SDS in Croatia, Bosnian SDS leaders advanced to the second stage in their regionalization campaign in autumn 1991 by proclaiming four Serb Autonomous Regions (SAO’s – singular *Srpska autonomna oblast*).¹⁸ On 17 September they proclaimed the Serb Autonomous Region of Romanija-Birač in the Sarajevo area.¹⁹ “Birač” is an area near the Drina River east of Sarajevo. Romanija is a mountain south of Sarajevo, and its name referred more generally to the mountainous areas east of the city. The name “Romanija” also bore symbolic significance, evoking the legacy of banditry (BCS “*hajduštvo*”) and past rural insurgencies against foreign occupiers in the rugged terrain around Sarajevo.²⁰

From its inception, the SAO Romanija-Birač was to be a Bosnian Serb counterpart to the city government of Sarajevo. On 25 September 1991, the Sarajevo City Board of the SDS established a committee, consisting of one representative from each of the city’s ten municipalities, to implement the Main Board’s regionalization policy.²¹ Of the five municipalities that initially made up SAO Romanija-Birač, only Pale was a constituent

municipality of the city of Sarajevo. However, the SAO's founders intended eventually to include "parts of other municipalities from this region with a majority Bosnian Serb population,"²² and Sarajevo was designated as the seat of SAO Romanija-Birač. In December 1991 the Bosnian Serb Assembly (first called the Assembly of the Serbian People of BiH, another body created as a parallel Serb institution) asserted its intent to exercise authority over the city in declaring that the "status of municipalities in the city of Sarajevo and in parts of the city in which the Serb nation represents a majority will be determined with a separate decision."²³ In December 1991, "Birač" was created as a separate SAO, leaving SAO Romanija to concentrate on Sarajevo and its environs.²⁴

In addition to building Serb-dominated organizations at the local and regional levels, SDS leaders in BiH created institutions at the republic level that prefigured formation of a separate Serb state. They undertook each major state-building step coincident with measures by SDA and HDZ leaders toward greater sovereignty or independence for BiH. As Karadžić later described it, "Each step of ours was evoked by one of Izetbegović's steps. ... They do something, we do something."²⁵ In October 1991, Izetbegović led SDA and HDZ delegates in promoting a "Platform of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of BiH" and a "Declaration of Sovereignty" in the Bosnian Assembly, after having fruitlessly sought passage of a similar resolution in February 1991.²⁶ SDS members stridently opposed this measure, which they correctly perceived as moving BiH closer to independence. After Assembly President and SDS member Momčilo Krajišnik adjourned a session that ran into the early morning hours of 15 October, HDZ and SDA delegates reconvened the assembly and, in the absence of SDS delegates, approved a declaration of sovereignty and a platform of the presidency of BiH.²⁷ (See "Serb Visions of Sarajevo," below, for a discussion of the rhetorical exchange at this session.) SDS leaders, responding rapidly, convened an expanded Party Council at 6:00 on the evening of 15 October. Speakers at the session proposed uniting the existing SAOs into a single Bosnian Serb polity.²⁸ Others advocated convening a separate assembly of the Serb people of BiH and holding a plebiscite asking Bosnian Serbs and other voters if they wished to remain in the SFRJ.

In the next three months, SDS leaders implemented the ideas advanced at the Party Council meeting of 15 October. On 24 October they held the founding session of a separate assembly (called here the Bosnian Serb Assembly to distinguish it from the multi-ethnic Assembly of BiH or Bosnian Assembly). The newly-formed Bosnian Serb Assembly consisted of Serbs who were elected to seats in the Bosnian Assembly in November 1990, a composition that allowed them to argue that delegates had been democratically elected. On 9 and 10 November 1991, the SDS held a plebiscite asking voters if they wished to remain in the SFRJ.²⁹ Non-Serbs were given yellow ballots to distinguish their votes from those of Bosnian Serbs.³⁰ Few Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats voted in the plebiscite, but Bosnian Serbs voted overwhelmingly to remain in the SFRJ. On many occasions after the vote, SDS leaders cited the plebiscite results as justification for establishing a separate Serb state.

In addition to creating separate Serb republic-level organizations, SDS leaders gave specific instructions to municipal party boards to form Serb organizations in most municipalities of BiH. At the third session of the Assembly of the Serbian People of BiH on 11 December 1991, SDS Party President Radovan Karadžić and Assembly President Momčilo Krajišnik proposed that such municipal-level Bosnian Serb institutions be created throughout BiH. However, yielding to objections from assembly delegates, they agreed to make the proposal optional for local SDS leaders.³¹ Eight days later, on 19 December 1991, the SDS Main Board abandoned the voluntary approach that the assembly had adopted. In a ten-page document, "Instructions for the Organization and Activity of the Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances," the SDS Main Board directed its municipal boards, in Sarajevo and throughout BiH, to establish Bosnian Serb single-national institutions wherever the party was organized.³²

In these instructions, the SDS Main Board differentiated municipalities where Serbs constituted a majority ("Variant A") from those in which they did not ("Variant B"). In each type of municipality, SDS municipal boards were instructed to form two institutions in their municipality: a "Crisis Staff of the Serb people" and an "assembly of the Serb people" (often called a "Serb Municipality").³³ The instructions effectively assured that both institutions would

be dominated by Serbs who were SDS members. In both Variant A and Variant B, the newly-created bodies were to “carry out preparations” to assume power in their respective municipalities. The instructions of Variant A and Variant B municipalities were similar in many ways, but only officials in “Variant B” were instructed:

in local communes and settlements with a predominant Serb population, to establish secret warehouses and depots for storing food and other deficient materials and manufacturing components, which should be removed through secret channels from commodity reserves warehouses at all levels...³⁴

In the last days of 1991 and in early 1992, Serb nationalists in the Sarajevo area implemented the SDS instructions of 19 December and created separate, parallel Serb institutions at the city and municipal levels. On 24 December 1991, the SDS formed a city-wide Crisis Staff that included members of the SDS Main Board and assigned individual members the task of implementing specific provisions of the instructions.³⁵ In the Ilijaš Municipal Assembly, SDS delegates, joined by several Serb delegates from multiethnic parties, won a close vote on 24 December to withdraw from the city of Sarajevo and join SAO Romanija.³⁶ On 3 January 1992, SDS leaders in Ilidža created a Serb Municipal Assembly, “in accordance with the given instructions of the Serb Democratic Party of BiH (Main Board), number 079 of 19 December 1991.”³⁷ Ilidža’s SDS leaders kept their decision secret for a week until after the Serb Republic had been proclaimed on 9 January 1992.³⁸ With two of Sarajevo’s four peripheral municipalities having defected to the SAO and the declaration of a Serb Municipal Assembly in Ilidža, the city of Sarajevo was well on the way to being encircled politically by Serb-controlled areas many months before it came under military siege.

Some municipal SDS officials, however, dallied in implementing the instructions, and one Sarajevo leader publicly refused to comply. Radomir Bulatović, President of the ethnically mixed Centar municipality in the heart of Sarajevo, adamantly opposed creating Serbian institutions there. On 19 March 1992 he stated, “I will not permit the division of these municipalities ... When I said that ... a Serbian Assembly would not be formed, I was heavily criticized. But I’ve said it to Karadžić and to the [SDS] Political Council.”³⁹ His objections were

subsequently rendered moot by other SDS members of the Municipal Assembly who formed a Serbian municipality without notifying him. More commonly, reluctant SDS municipal leaders simply procrastinated. The instructions of 19 December contained no deadline, so the campaign to create parallel institutions, particularly in municipalities where non-Serbs made up a majority, proceeded unevenly in the first three months of 1992.⁴⁰

In late March, Karadžić told the Bosnian Serb Assembly delegates it was time to complete the process. "Newly established municipalities must establish their organs as soon as possible, have their stamps made and start to work," he said. "The police, that is, our organs must be positioned at the border. ... Freedom of movement would, of course, be granted, but they must not enter the area with armed forces or anything else that would threaten our territory, our municipality."⁴¹ Under urging from Karadžić and Krajišnik, the Bosnian Serb Assembly directed that all local boards implement the directive within three days.⁴² By the end of March, most SDS local leaders in BiH had complied by establishing a Crisis Staff and a Serb Municipal Assembly in their respective municipalities. Also in accord with Karadžić's wishes as expressed on 24 March, SDS officials established a parallel Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs (**MUP: *Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova***) and authorized local authorities to create separate Serb police forces throughout BiH.

At the time in early 1992 when SDS leaders were establishing their first all-Serbian political institutions, Bosnian Serb leaders in Pale were strengthening their control over political and economic institutions in their municipality. In late December 1991, Pale officials separated their ski center and the Jahorina and Bistrica hotels from the Olympic Center in downtown Sarajevo and stopped forwarding revenues to the center's headquarters.⁴³ Pale municipal police also tightened their control of roads leading into the area. A reporter visiting in late January recounted being stopped by the police twice before entering the town, and being greeted by a large, red-lettered "Serbia" sign upon entering the village.⁴⁴ Asserting that the Bosnian Serbs had "lost confidence in the possibility of agreement with the Muslim nation" and had been attacked by militant Bosnian Muslims, a body calling itself the "Crisis Staff of SAO Romanija" declared

on 3 March 1992 that the Bosnian Serbs would “undertake all measures to assume full control on the territory of SAO Romanija.”⁴⁵

Three years later, SDS Party President Karadžić reminded members of the Assembly of the Serbian Republic of the party’s success in seizing power in Serb-inhabited municipalities:

At the moment the war began, in the municipalities where we were in the majority, we had municipal power, held it firmly, [we] controlled everything. In municipalities where we were in the minority, a secret authority was formed, a municipal committee, a municipal assembly, president of the executive committee. You will remember the A and B variants. In the B variant, where we were in the minority – 20%, 15% -- we had set up a government and a brigade, a unit no matter what size, but there was a detachment with a commander.⁴⁶

As Karadžić’s 1995 remarks make clear, the SDS campaign was closely linked with the party’s effort to organize the Bosnian Serbs militarily.

Military Preparations

In 1991 and early 1992, the three nationalist parties took measures to prepare militarily for war. Bosnian Muslim leaders of the SDA sponsored the creation of two paramilitary groups, the Patriotic League and the Green Berets.⁴⁷ Two Croatian paramilitary groups at one time or another conducted operations in BiH: HOS (*Hrvatske obrambene snage* -- “Croatian Defense Force”), loyal to the Croatian Party of Right headed by Dobroslav Paraga; and the Croatian ZNG (*Zbor narodne garde* -- “Muster of the National Guard”), associated with the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian HDZ.⁴⁸ Political formations in Serbia sponsored several Serb paramilitary organizations, some of which operated at one time or another in BiH.⁴⁹ The SDS, as described above, supported the JNA’s Croatia campaign, coordinated plans with JNA units in BiH, and secured political control in Serb-inhabited areas where the JNA could operate without local opposition.

In the post-election arms race in BiH, the JNA was the decisive force, the only military formation with an integrated command structure and large numbers of heavy weapons and

aircraft. The JNA was the heir to Tito's Second World War Partisans. It was constitutionally mandated to defend the homeland and preserve the SFRJ, and many of its officers were fiercely loyal to the concept of federal Yugoslavia.⁵⁰ After the League of Communists of Yugoslavia collapsed in January 1990 and fragmented into republic-level parties, the JNA was the only institution with significant power that could claim to represent the federal state. At that time it held a monopoly on heavy weapons in the SFRJ. The war in Croatia gradually transformed the JNA there from a Yugoslav force to one dominated by Serb and Montenegrin officers, as those of other nationalities left the army and often joined the forces it was fighting.⁵¹ Faced with manpower shortages stemming from these defections, the JNA ordered reservists in BiH to active duty on 28 September 1991.⁵² The next day, the Presidency of BiH denounced the JNA's mobilization order as illegal, thereby discouraging reservists in BiH from serving in the JNA's Croatia campaign.⁵³ Consequently most Croats and Muslims stayed home, while some Bosnian Serbs fought with the JNA in Croatia, often as volunteers organized by SDS activists in various municipalities of BiH.⁵⁴

Units of the Territorial Defense (**TO**; *Teritorijalna odbrana*), an integral part of the defense scheme in the SFRJ, came in 1991 and 1992 to play a key role in the inter-party contest for control of security forces. Although TO units were in principle integrated with the JNA, they also reported to the Ministries of Defense of the individual Yugoslav republics. Therefore they held the potential to become the nucleus of a military force loyal to the republic's authorities. Socialist-era Yugoslav defense theory held that a foreign invader should be defeated by the main fighting units of the JNA but that local TO forces might be required to resist in isolation until the full might of the JNA could be brought to bear.⁵⁵ The TO units were organized at the local level, primarily in factories, offices, and other places of work. Since TO units were designed to operate even in the absence of the JNA in the event of an invasion, each unit was provided with light weapons suitable for mobile guerilla fighters. Citing concerns about the security of weapons under TO control, the JNA in May 1990 ordered that weapons be removed from the control of local TO units and moved to its own armories.⁵⁶ Most units complied with this order, but many TO units in BiH either retained some arms or acquired new ones in the course of 1991 and early 1992.

The JNA used BiH as a staging area to support its war in neighboring Croatia and also sought to strengthen its own presence in BiH in late 1991 and early 1992. General Veljko Kadijević, the Federal Secretary of Defense of the SFRJ from May until 6 January 1992, similarly attributed the superior arms of the SDS to support from the JNA:

When it proved fruitless for the JNA to orient the Muslim part of Bosnia's leadership toward a new Yugoslav state made of those Yugoslav nations who still wanted it, we had to orient ourselves toward concrete cooperation with the representatives of the Serb nation and with the Serb people as a whole, never closing the door on cooperation with others, individuals who supported a new Yugoslavia. Thus we assured that during the war in Croatia we executed maneuvers and movements of JNA forces through BiH, which was of vital significance for the JNA. ... We felt that after withdrawal from Croatia, there had to be stronger JNA presence in BiH.⁵⁷

The inclination of many JNA officers to support the Bosnian Serbs became well known through press disclosures and from the conduct of some JNA units. On 14 November 1991, JNA reservists from the Užica Corps entered Sarajevo in a column of vehicles, fired weapons into the air as they drove through the city from west to east, turned around, and continued firing as they departed.⁵⁸ Aleksandra Balvanović, HDZ member and Vice President of the Sarajevo City Assembly, denounced the reservists' incursion as part of a broader Serbian plan to incite violence, and she warned the assembly that armed units were being formed in Serb-majority suburbs of Sarajevo.⁵⁹ In an article published on 22 November 1991 in the Sarajevo magazine *Slobodna Bosna*, journalists claimed to have documents showing that the SDS had formed a "war staff" and made detailed plans to besiege and attack Sarajevo in the event of war.⁶⁰ The article claimed that the SDS had plans to evacuate Serbs from Sarajevo and relocate them to "predominantly Serbian areas such as Pale, Trebević, Jahorina, Romanija, etc." Suspicion of the JNA's intentions was further aroused in December 1991, when delegates in the Stari grad municipal assembly viewed a videotape of preparations for artillery emplacements in the hills above the municipality.⁶¹

The transformation of the JNA in BiH was arranged in advance by federal officials in Belgrade. Anticipating that BiH would become an independent state, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević met Federal Presidency member Borisav Jović on 5 December 1991 and

ordered that Bosnian recruits stationed in other republics be transferred to BiH and that citizens of other republics serving in BiH be transferred out.⁶² Jović wrote, "We immediately called Veljko Kadijević and included him in the conversation. Sloba told him directly that it would be necessary to execute a swap of troops: Everyone from BiH to BiH, and vice versa."⁶³ On 25 December 1991, JNA Commander Kadijević reported to Milošević and Jović that these transfers were 90% complete.⁶⁴ Jović told journalists Laura Silber and Allen Little that by April 1992 (the month the EC recognized BiH as an independent state) all but 10 – 15% of the 90,000 JNA troops stationed in BiH were Bosnian-born.⁶⁵

On 1 January 1992, the JNA was reorganized in the aftermath of its withdrawal from Croatia. Sarajevo was elevated from the headquarters of an army corps to that of the Second Army District with responsibility for almost all of BiH.⁶⁶ General Milutin Kukanjac was appointed Commander of the Second Army District. In his several months as commander in Sarajevo, he negotiated among nationalist party leaders to defuse tensions, promote political solutions, and avert the outbreak of war. At the same time he was serving as a political mediator, Kukanjac oversaw a large-scale redeployment of JNA assets to municipalities with Serb majorities and into the hands of local SDS committees, as reported to his superiors in a report dated March 1992.⁶⁷ In an article published in 2000, he described his actions in 1992 on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs:

At the right time we began the redeployment of the entire movable property owned by the JNA. ... With extraordinary organization we withdrew, saved, and preserved everything. ... Not a single airplane, helicopter, tank, armored personnel carrier, cannon, mortar, or motorized vehicle fell into the hands of the Muslim-Croat hordes.⁶⁸

In his report of March 1992, General Kukanjac provided his superiors with a list of available manpower numbering 69,198 men from 75 of BiH's 109 municipalities.⁶⁹ Of those, 7,100 were listed in Sarajevo's four "peripheral" municipalities of Ilijaš, Hadžići, Trnovo and Pale, amounting to 40% of the total of 17,900 men from Sarajevo's ten municipalities.

In his speech to the 50th Bosnian Serb Assembly session in April 1995, Karadžić recalled this collaborative effort between the JNA and SDS: "Distribution of arms was carried out thanks

to the JNA. What could be withdrawn was withdrawn and distributed to the people in Serb areas, but it was the SDS which organized the people and created the army.”⁷⁰ The JNA’s redeployment of arms to the SDS was to bestow military advantages on the Bosnian Serb nationalists when armed conflict began in April 1992.

The Road to Bosnian Independence, Serb Secession, and War

The republics of Slovenia and Croatia were far ahead of BiH in seeking to become independent states. On 25 June 1991, the assemblies of both republics simultaneously declared independence. The JNA contested these moves and moved to take control of security installations on Slovenia’s borders, but its forces were surprisingly ineffective and unsuccessful. The European Community (forerunner of the European Union) quickly dispatched mediators to end the war. In the EC-mediated Brioni Agreement of 7 July 1991, the SFRY and the republics agreed to a cease-fire and the republics of Slovenia and Croatia agreed to suspend implementation of their declarations of independence for 90 days.⁷¹ The EC subsequently established the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia (ECCY) to avert further violence and reach negotiated agreements among the contending republics and the federal state. In an effort to establish consistent standards for recognition, EC foreign ministers met on 17 December 1991 and approved a procedure for Yugoslavia’s republics to apply for independence. The foreign ministers instructed the EC’s Arbitration Commission, headed by French jurist Robert Badinter, to invite and assess applications from any Yugoslav republic seeking independence.⁷² It pledged to assess applicants to determine if independence represented the popular will and if their legal systems contained adequate guidelines for protecting individual and minority rights.⁷³ On 20 December, the Presidency of BiH, over the dissenting voices of its two SDS members, voted to apply to the Badinter Commission for BiH to be recognized as independent.⁷⁴

SDS leaders responded to the move toward independence by accelerating their drive for a separate Serb state. On 21 December 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly met and approved “preparations for the formation of a Serb Republic.”⁷⁵ On 9 January 1992, these “preparations”

became reality as the assembly proclaimed the "Serb Republic of BiH."⁷⁶ On 11 January 1992, the Badinter Commission issued its recommendation that BiH hold a referendum to determine the will of its people regarding independence.⁷⁷ In the early morning hours of 25 January, the Bosnian Assembly voted to hold such a referendum on the weekend of 29 February and 1 March. The circumstances of that vote recalled the assembly's approval of a memorandum and platform on 14-15 October: After the assembly president adjourned the session, most Serb delegates departed, and the resolution was then passed by Croat and Muslim deputies. The next day, 26 February, the Bosnian Serb Assembly met and denounced as illegal the Bosnian Assembly's decision to hold a referendum. Bosnian Serb Assembly delegates demanded the "transformation of BiH" (meaning its territorial division) before any referendum.⁷⁸ But the government of BiH proceeded with its plans, and international monitors were assigned to observe the voting. Just hours before the referendum was to begin, the Bosnian Serb Assembly met again and proclaimed a "Constitution of the Serbian Republic of BiH" that had been in preparation for some weeks.⁷⁹ Article One specified, "The Serbian Republic of BiH is a state of the Serbian people and citizens who live in it."⁸⁰

Voters in the referendum generally followed the instructions of their nationalist party leaders. In accord with the recommendation of SDA and HDZ leaders, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats voted overwhelmingly for independence.⁸¹ The vast majority of Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum at the urging of Bosnian Serb nationalist leaders, who argued that the Serbian nation had already expressed its wish to remain in the SFRJ in the SDS-organized plebiscite of 9 and 10 November 1991. Following the referendum, the EC declared its intent to recognize BiH as an independent state. Contrary to many published accounts, no governmental body of BiH declared the republic's independence after the referendum. The republic's leaders secured independence by virtue of EC and US recognition, which took effect on 7 April 1992, rather than by their own proclamation.

Within hours after the polls closed, some SDS members and their supporters took up arms, donned masks, and erected barricades at key transit points throughout Sarajevo. Muslims of the SDA responded by putting up their own barricades in strategic locations, often directly

across from the SDS barriers, creating what became known as “sandwich barricades.” At a press conference on 2 March, SDS party leaders asserted that the barricades were a spontaneous response to a shooting at a Bosnian Serb wedding in Sarajevo’s Old Orthodox Church in which the bridegroom’s father was killed and an Orthodox priest was wounded.⁸² Late in the afternoon of 2 March, General Kukanjac, acting as a mediator in his role as commander of the JNA Second Army District, convened a meeting of key nationalist party leaders and obtained their agreement to dismantle the barricades. That night, SDS and SDA leaders visited many barricade sites and urged their followers to take them down.⁸³

The barricades evoked a strong popular response among Sarajevans. On the evening of 2 March, thousands of protesters gathered in central meeting places and formed a column that wound its way past many of the barricades and demanded their removal.⁸⁴ This popular action took place just as the agreement negotiated by Kukanjac was being implemented. The marchers, however, felt empowered by the apparent success of their undertaking and continued to attend peace demonstrations that occurred intermittently over the next month. Although both the SDS and SDA shunned these demonstrations, the opposition Social Democrats and thousands of Sarajevans embraced the “Valter” movement, named after the best-known hero of the city’s resistance to German occupation in the Second World War.⁸⁵ The next day, 3 March, some barricades reappeared. This time no nationalist party leader claimed responsibility for them. Kukanjac urgently convened another meeting that led to a second agreement to deploy joint patrols of the JNA and local police of the BiH MUP to prevent further barricade activity.⁸⁶ Both SDS and SDA leaders praised this outcome, and the battle of dueling barricades came to an end with the deployment of the joint patrols. Although the joint patrols operated for some weeks with few problems, they served to defer war rather than avert it, and the JNA continued to transfer some of its arms to the Bosnian Serbs. “The patrols postponed some events, and that was in the interest of the Serbs,” Kukanjac recalled in a 1994 TV interview.⁸⁷

Officials of the BiH MUP, after an investigation, concluded that some 19 police officers, both Serbs and Muslims, had participated on one side or another of the barricade episodes, and they placed the blame for coordinating the barricade campaign on high Serb officials in MUP.⁸⁸

SDS leaders, for their part, complained that Muslim police officials were aiding the Green Berets (a Muslim paramilitary organization) and that Serb policemen had suffered discrimination at the hands of Croats and Muslims in the Ministry of Interior.⁸⁹ On 15 March, Serb policemen in Stari grad station quit their posts, leaving the station in the hands of non-Serb officers.⁹⁰ Subsequently, on 24 March 1992, Serb police commanders terminated all five non-Serb police officers in Pale and three non-Serb officers in the nearby municipality of Sokolac and relieved them of their weapons and equipment.⁹¹ Malko Koroman, Chief of Police in Pale, explained that he had acted "in accord with decisions made by the government of SAO Romanija, which had given the order."⁹² The firings, he said, were responses to the departure of Bosnian Serb policemen from their employment in Stari grad. On March 31, Momčilo Mandić, an SDS member who was then Deputy Commander of the MUP of BiH, proclaimed in a telex to all police stations that a separate Serb MUP would begin operating the next day, 1 April 1992, throughout BiH.⁹³

Large-scale violence erupted during the holiday weekend prior to 7 April, the date when the EC and US recognition of BiH's independence took effect. On 5 April, Serb units attacked the police academy located at Vraca, a high point just south of the city's main east-west thoroughfare.⁹⁴ About 6:00 p.m., the school director surrendered, and about 400 cadets were taken as prisoners. That night, tens of thousands of Sarajevans held another "Valter" march and entered the hall of the Bosnian Assembly, demanding the resignation of nationalists. The next day, 6 April, they continued their protest on the large open space between the Assembly Building and the Holiday Inn Hotel. In mid-afternoon of 6 April, gunfire erupted from the roof of the Holiday Inn, which for some weeks had been the headquarters for the SDS party leadership. Six demonstrators were killed, and the other demonstrators scattered in fear of their lives. BiH police arrived and captured six gunmen in the Holiday Inn, but Karadžić, his entourage, and other gunmen had already left the hotel.⁹⁵ (The six gunmen were eventually released, exchanged for the police cadets held as prisoners at the Vraca academy.) The attack of 6 April ended the Valter movement and was followed by further violence. That night, artillery fire raked the central tramway depot, and mortar and artillery fire hit the old city. JNA units seized control of Sarajevo's airport in Butmir, claiming that it was only seeking to secure the airport and separate the contending factions.⁹⁶

Civilian leaders of all groups consolidated their military organizations in the two months following the outbreak of armed hostilities in Sarajevo on 6 April 1992. Croat nationalist leaders formed the Croatian Defense Council (**HVO**; *Hrvatsko vijeće obrane*) on 8 April.⁹⁷ On 15 April 1992, the presidency of BiH ordered armed units consolidated under the republic's TO command,⁹⁸ the first step in creating a unified Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (**ARBiH**; *Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*) later that month. The JNA in BiH was transformed into the military force of the Bosnian Serbs. On 4 May, the Yugoslav Federal Presidency ordered the withdrawal of JNA forces from BiH within 15 days. Four days later, the same body sent some 38 JNA generals into retirement. It also directed that General Kukanjac be replaced as commander of the Second Military District by Ratko Mladić, a veteran of the JNA's Croatia campaign. The Bosnian Serb Assembly, meeting in Banja Luka, voted on 12 May to create the Bosnian Serb Army (**VRS** - *Vojska Republike Srpske*) and designated Mladić as its first commander. Ratko Mladić's tenure as commander of the JNA's Second Army District had lasted only days before he became commander of the VRS.

The formal withdrawal of the JNA units from BiH left most heavy weaponry and the vast majority of troops to continue the campaign under the indigenous command of Bosnian Serbs. The JNA Chief of Staff, General Veljko Kadijević, summarized the process: "The commands and units of the JNA made up the backbone of the RS army and fully equipped it with weaponry and equipment."⁹⁹ Each of the five army corps in BiH was renamed while retaining most of its personnel and many of its weapons. The Sarajevo-based Fourth Corps of the JNA became the Romanija Corps of the VRS, giving the VRS a military unit with an area of responsibility that coincided with the civilian-led SAO Romanija. The Romanija Corps, formed with a force of approximately 13,000 men, maintained the encirclement of Sarajevo for the rest of the war. Its principal adversary was to be the First Corps of the ARBiH, the unit charged with defending Sarajevo.

Serb Visions of Sarajevo

Karadžić and other SDS officials accorded Sarajevo a central position in their strategic thinking. Their vision evolved over time and varied depending on the audience for which it was expressed. With the advent of war, they implemented their strategic intention to divide Sarajevo into what they called its Serb and Muslim parts and developed radically different visions of the fate they desired for each part.

On several occasions in fall 1991, Karadžić expressed a desire to either confine or eliminate Sarajevo's Muslims. On 8 September, enraged that Muslim police in the town of Otok on the Croatian border had detained Croatian Serb interior minister Milan Martić, Karadžić told Serbian President Milošević in a phone conversation that Serbs in the Sarajevo area were getting ready to blockade the city: "Romanija has informed me that they are preparing to block Sarajevo," he told Milošević. "No one will be able to leave Sarajevo."¹⁰⁰ In a conversation with SDS Vice President Nikola Koljević that same day, he repeated the prospect that SDS officials around Sarajevo would impose a blockade: "They'll cut off Sarajevo! Nobody will be able to leave Sarajevo in any direction. Nobody in any direction!"¹⁰¹ In mid-October 1991, angered that SDA and HDZ delegates in the Bosnian Assembly were proposing a memorandum of sovereignty (see "The Serb Campaign for Regionalization" above), Karadžić told his long-time friend and fellow writer Gojko Djogo in a private telephone conversation that Muslim Sarajevans would die for attempting to become independent of the SFRJ:

They do not understand how the Serbs are boiling, how the Serbs take long to rouse, but once they are aroused it takes long to calm them. ... They must know that there are 20,000 armed Serbs around Sarajevo, man. Sarajevo will be a melting pot in which 300,000 Muslims will die. ... What do you think you can do, secede like Croatia?¹⁰²

In the same conversation, Karadžić told Djogo he intended to allow Muslims to rule small enclaves: "He [Bosnian President Izetbegović – rjd] can have the power in half of Sarajevo, Zenica, in half of Tuzla, and that's it. ... They do not understand that there would be bloodshed and that the Muslim people would disappear."¹⁰³

On 15 October, Karadžić voiced a variant of these threats from the podium of the Bosnian Assembly, but he did not specifically mention Sarajevo and proposed no specific number of Muslims who would die. Some weeks before, Krajišnik had gently cautioned Karadžić against saying that only Muslims would perish: "We should say that we will all disappear, both, you know," he told Karadžić. "We should deliberately say this."¹⁰⁴ But in speaking to the Bosnian Assembly on 15 October, Karadžić repeated the threat he expressed to Djogo while attempting to transfer responsibility for the Muslim's disappearance to their own leaders: "Don't think that you won't lead Bosnia and Herzegovina into hell and possibly the Muslim nation to disappear, for the Muslim people cannot defend itself if there will be war here."¹⁰⁵ His statement provoked a sharp response from Izetbegović, who cited his "statement and manner of its presentation" as reasons why BiH might not want to remain in Yugoslavia.

After Karadžić's combative statement to the Assembly on 15 October and the sharp retort it evoked, SDS leaders adopted the theme of "separation" (sometimes expressed as "territorialization") of Sarajevo into "Muslim" and "Serb" parts as their major theme. At the meeting on the evening of 15 October (discussed above), one party leader proposed to form a "Serb government with its seat in Sarajevo, which could link all our regions."¹⁰⁶ Another participant said it was time to part with the illusion that a framework could be found for common life with Muslims and Croats. He asserted that the various Serb regions must be ready to blockade commercial routes entering Sarajevo.¹⁰⁷ In the aftermath of this meeting, SDS leaders at several levels advanced additional proposals to divide Serb from non-Serb areas. In the Sarajevo municipality of Ilijaš, SDS delegates to the municipal assembly proposed on 29 October that the "Serb part" of that municipality separate from the city of Sarajevo and join SAO Romanija.¹⁰⁸ Karadžić, speaking in December 1991, stated, "It seems to me that at this moment in time, given the amount of mutual suspicion, we should aim for as much separation as possible, and only later on let life and economic reasons bring people together."¹⁰⁹

In January 1992 SDS Vice President Nikola Koljević, meeting with Croatian President Tudjman and his advisers in Zagreb, advocated "humane population transfers" to assure the separation of the peoples of BiH.¹¹⁰ Tudjman responded affirmatively, noting that "history has

shown the need for resettlements from time to time.” In April 1992 Koljević stated publicly that the division of the republic should start in Sarajevo and urged that work on boundaries of “national communities” start immediately, “so that Sarajevo will be territorialized.”¹¹¹

In the first half of May 1992, as war raged in much of the republic, Bosnian Serb Assembly delegates reiterated their commitment to ethnic division by adopting six “strategic priorities, that is to say, the strategic goals for the Serb people.”¹¹² Reaffirming the principle of division that had guided the SDS since autumn 1991, the delegates specified as their first goal “separation from the other two national communities ‘ separation of states.”¹¹³ Assembly President Krajišnik called that principle “the most important one. ... All other goals are sub-items of the first one. Have we finally decided to separate from the remaining two national communities? We can part from them if BiH is to be torn into three parts.”¹¹⁴

The other five goals identified specific territorial objectives. The fifth goal advocated “division of the city of Sarajevo into Serb and Muslim parts and implementation of an effective state government in each of these two parts”¹¹⁵ In explaining this goal to the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Karadžić underlined the city’s importance in the outcome of the war:

Sarajevo is strategically in fifth place, but the battle in Sarajevo and for Sarajevo, seen strategically and tactically, is of decisive importance. ... Alija [Izetbegović – rjd] does not have a state as long as we have a part of Sarajevo. ... Because the fighting around Sarajevo is decisive [to] the destiny of BiH, and we suspected and said so before that if there were a war it would start in Sarajevo and end in Sarajevo.¹¹⁶

Bosnian Serb nationalist leaders repeated or cited the six strategic goals a number of times in subsequent assembly sessions. Karadžić and Krajišnik summarized them several times in the assembly and insisted that they could not be changed or abandoned.¹¹⁷ At various times, SDS officials explained their more specific understanding of the goals adopted on 12 May. At a meeting of military and municipal leaders two days later on 14 May 1992, SDS leader Milan Malidža, president of the municipal assembly of Mrkonjić Grad, related his understanding of the fifth strategic goal: “It was said that Sarajevo must be divided or razed to the ground.”¹¹⁸ In July 1994 Karadžić gave a more specific iteration of the first strategic goal: “to rid the house of our

enemies, that is, the Croats and Muslims, so that we will no longer be together in a state."¹¹⁹ Krajišnik, objecting to provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, insisted that the goals were permanent:

The mission of this republic and its first strategic goal is for us to divide from Muslims and Croats, and no one has the right to create a strategy whereby Serb Sarajevo remains in a common state. Thus any kind of danger or wish for a connection and solution for Sarajevo is excluded such that we want to stay with the Muslims and Croats.¹²⁰

Several speakers acknowledged at the assembly's session on 12 May that the city was already in the grip of Serb forces. SDS President Radovan Karadžić told the assembly, "We hold all our areas, all the municipalities, all the settlements around Sarajevo, and we hold our enemies ... in complete encirclement, so that they cannot receive military aid, in manpower or in weapons."¹²¹ Trifko Radić, representative of the western Sarajevo municipality of Ilijaš where the Bosnian government forces had failed to break through in April, could now claim that he and his colleagues had sealed off the city:

We are prepared. We hold 50 km of the line of encirclement around Ilijaš. We are organized and I have asked the TV to come and record how well organized for the war we are in Ilijaš, how our defence lines are organized. ... We have cut off and mined the railway line and no one can arrive in Sarajevo. We have mined the motorway too. We shall do our best to prevent the enemy from ever getting to Sarajevo from the direction of Zenica, and anyone who tries the upper route will also meet his end.¹²²

Dragan Kalinić, Minister of Health of the Serbian Republic of BiH, denounced as inimical to Serbian interests an agreement, signed that very day, whereby the JNA allowed the United Nations to use the Sarajevo airport to deliver humanitarian aid to Sarajevo.¹²³ He saw war as the only satisfactory option:

Knowing who our enemies are, how perfidious they are, how they cannot be trusted until they are physically, militarily destroyed and crushed, which, of course, implies eliminating and liquidating their key people. I do not hesitate in selecting the first option, the option of war, because I believe ... that the fate of Serbs in BiH cannot be solved in any other way but by war.¹²⁴

As part of that war, he advocated destroying one of Sarajevo's major medical facilities:

Those who will be planning the Sarajevo operation, either of liberating Sarajevo or of destroying the enemy forces in Sarajevo, will have to plan what to do with the medical facilities. And let me tell you this right now, if the Military Hospital is to end up in the hands of the enemy, I am for the destruction of the Koševo hospital so that the enemy has nowhere to go for medical help.¹²⁵

General Mladić, the newly-designated commander of the VRS, urged the assembly to tighten the noose around the city. "If you want to make the Muslims surrender, 300 guns must be densely planted around Sarajevo, of caliber ranging from Zolja /hand-held rocket launcher/ 40-64 millimetres to Orkan/multiple rocket launcher/ and P-65 rockets." General Mladić advocated placing the city in a stranglehold of the VRS:

And we have to put a ring around the dragon's head of Sarajevo this very moment, and only those whom we let out should be allowed out, and this 'we' is not just anyone among us, but the one who is in charge, who is the commander.¹²⁶

Mladić further proposed to withhold vital municipal services from Sarajevo while blaming the Bosnian government side:

We are not going to say that we are going to destroy the power supply pylons or turn off the water supply, no because that would get America out of its seat, but gentlemen, please, fine, well, one day there is no water at all in Sarajevo. ... Therefore, we have to wisely tell the world, it was they who were shooting, hit the transmission line and the power went off, they were shooting at the water supply facilities, there was a power cut at such and such a place, we are doing our best repairing this, that is what diplomacy is ...¹²⁷

The diplomacy advocated by Mladić became an essential part of the dual-track approach to the siege adopted by Serbian leaders. The public position of senior SDS officials, and of senior commanders of the VRS, was that Serb armed forces were merely defending the Serb-inhabited areas around Sarajevo against assaults by the ABiH. Bosnian Serb leaders resolutely declined to call the military situation a "siege," the term normally used by global media and UN officials. Instead, Mladić claimed that Bosnian Muslim forces were attacking Serbs in Sarajevo's suburbs from within the city and holding Serbs in the city center against their will. "The Serb side... was and still is deeply disturbed by the situation that now prevails in Sarajevo," he wrote in an open letter to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and several western leaders in September 1992. "Between 40,000 to 50,000 Serbs are held as ethnic hostages and the constant daily attacks

on Serbian municipalities Ilidža, Lukavica, Ilijaš, Vogošća take place.”¹²⁸ He accounted for civilian casualties in the city by blaming the city’s defenders:

The Muslim side keeps committing crimes against their own population, bombing their own cities and towns, killing their own people in bread-queues, on market-places, at funerals, attacking UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) personnel and facilities, and now starting to shoot down humanitarian relief planes, all that with the purpose of provoking international wrath against the Serbs.¹²⁹

In contrast to his pre-war stance favoring Pale’s removal from the city of Sarajevo, Karadžić contended that Pale was an integral part of the city and therefore worthy of being designated the capital city of Republika Srpska. “The Republika Srpska exists. Its capital is Sarajevo, that is, Serb Sarajevo, and Pale belongs to Serb Sarajevo, because Pale is a Sarajevo municipality.”¹³⁰ Furthermore, Karadžić envisioned Serb Sarajevo as a counterpart to what he called the city’s “Muslim part.” By summer 1992, Bosnian Serb forces had taken control of municipalities on their side of the siege lines. Non-Serbs either departed or were driven out, leaving those communities overwhelmingly Serb in population. Nedeljko Prstojević, Ilidža’s delegate in the Bosnian Serb Assembly, credited Karadžić with the inspiration to rid Sarajevo’s suburbs of its Muslim inhabitants:

When the Serbs in Sarajevo began their uprising and took a certain amount of territory under their control, at that time there was no government, or at least no one knew where it was. Furthermore, in the first days, we didn’t know if Karadžić was alive, and when he walked among us in Ilidža and emboldened us, Serbs in Sarajevo held the required territory under their control, and in certain areas extended their territory and drove Muslims from territories where they were effectively a majority.¹³¹

As war continued, Karadžić expressed hopes that Serb Sarajevo would become the strategically central hub of a postwar Serb state:

Sarajevo will be divided and become two cities. ... Everything that is Serb we will retain. For us, Sarajevo integrates eastern Herzegovina, Old Herzegovina, and Romanija. ... Romanija has its urban core in Sarajevo, and it will stay that way.”¹³²

Few of these far-reaching plans were realized, either during or after the war.

Tightening the Siege

Following BiH's recognition as an independent state by the EC and US on 7 April, armed conflict took place in Sarajevo on most days of April 1992. Fighting was punctuated by internationally-negotiated ceasefires that lasted at most three days. The city was shelled from the surrounding hills. Koševo hospital and the Institute for Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation in Ilidža were shelled, and UNPROFOR troops who attempted to rescue patients came under sniper fire.¹³³ The Sarajevo Radio and Television Center was hit repeatedly, while SDS officials denounced the alleged bias of Sarajevo TV and demanded that it be split into three parts. The Olympic Museum and its contents were destroyed by fire after it was shelled on 25 April 1992.

The military struggle for Sarajevo pitted the well-armed VRS against the well-manned but under-equipped ARBiH. Intermittently throughout April 1992, Bosnian Serb forces including the TO, police, and paramilitary units fought against TO and police units under Bosnian government control and paramilitaries controlled by Muslim and Croat nationalist parties. These battles were largely fought in Sarajevo's western and northern suburbs, principally in the municipalities of Ilidža, Ilijaš, and Novi grad. Aided by the heavy weapons of the JNA, Serbian forces gradually took control of much of this territory. The JNA expanded its control of approaches to the city by establishing roadblocks along key roads. By the end of April, the contour of Sarajevo's siege was largely established. The front lines of the siege are shown in Map Three.

In the eyes of many international observers, recognition of BiH's independence meant that the JNA had become a foreign army intervening in another country's domestic affairs. This was the contingency for which Milošević and Jović had planned in late 1991. On 27 April 1992, Milošević backers reorganized the Yugoslav Federation to consist only of the republics of Montenegro and Serbia, along with its formerly autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and adopted a new constitution. That same day, the Presidency of BiH ordered the JNA to withdraw from the newly-independent republic.¹³⁴ When the JNA failed to withdraw immediately, special police of the BiH Ministry of the Interior and other units loyal to the

government of BiH began surrounding some of the 16 JNA facilities in Sarajevo. The encircled JNA troops and their equipment became valuable but well-armed hostages, and tense negotiations ensued to secure their uncontested withdrawal from BiH.

On 2 May, the JNA and allied Serbian forces launched an armored assault on the city.¹³⁵ The JNA sent tanks into the area near the Presidency, but they were repelled by foot soldiers using antitank weapons. The central post office, which also contained telephone switching equipment vital to the city's links with the outside world, was destroyed. Yugoslav MIG aircraft flew overhead as the JNA and allied forces attacked from the south, west, and north. The outgunned TO forces of BiH nevertheless stemmed the assault, and the BiH forces held the central city and small areas extending west and north. The next day, 3 May, they launched the first of several counterattacks that failed to break through the Serbian positions holding the western suburbs.¹³⁶ The failed JNA offensive of 2 and 3 May 1992 proved to be the last major act of Kukanjac's command. As noted above, he was relieved on 4 May and replaced by Ratko Mladić as commander of the Second Military District.

Sarajevo and its Siege in the International Spotlight

From the first days of armed attacks on the city, global attention was riveted on Sarajevo. Many foreign journalists and representatives of international organizations made the city their headquarters during the war, occasioning media coverage of Sarajevo's plight disproportionate to other areas of BiH. Sarajevo was accorded a special place in negotiations to end the war in BiH, and it was consistently highlighted in United Nations reports and resolutions. A succession of different individual negotiators and international agencies took the lead in seeking an end to the war, and each of them directed some attention to ending the siege and returning the city to a more normal condition.¹³⁷

As noted above, the ECCY was the first international body to oversee peace negotiations for the former Yugoslavia. Its negotiators first directed their efforts toward ending the war in Croatia, and on 2 January 1992, the JNA and Croatia signed an agreement known as the Vance

Plan (named after former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance) in Sarajevo that ended, for a time, hostilities in Croatia. The parties agreed to deployment of a United Nations force, UNPROFOR, along lines of separation between their forces, giving the United Nations the lead in the international military presence on the ground.

UNPROFOR was initially mandated to operate as a peacekeeping force in Croatia to monitor compliance with the Vance Plan of January 1992. It was first headquartered in Sarajevo. Its lead contingents arrived in to set up headquarters in Sarajevo in early March 1992, as the city was poised on the brink of armed conflict between Serb forces and supporters of the government of BiH. Escalating violence in Sarajevo eventually forced UNPROFOR in May 1992 to relocate its headquarters to Zagreb, and when UNPROFOR received a mandate to operate in BiH, its primary mission was to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians. Although its commanders regularly negotiated cease-fires and otherwise mediated among parties to the conflict, UNPROFOR in BiH did not have the benefit of a peace agreement such as the Vance Plan in Croatia, and it was not deployed along front lines to separate combatants as it was in Croatia. Nevertheless, with over 10,000 troops, UNPROFOR represented the largest and most conspicuous presence of the international community in BiH throughout the war.

After the Vance Plan was signed in January 1992, the ECCY, through its Working Group on Bosnia-Herzegovina, turned its attention to BiH. Portuguese Foreign Minister José Cutiliero led ten rounds of talks in London, Brussels, Lisbon, and Sarajevo in the first seven months of 1992 in search of an agreement to avert or end hostilities. He treated the leaders of the three nationalist parties as equals and promoted constitutional arrangements that amounted to de facto partition of BiH into three non-contiguous units, each dominated by a single nation. At the fifth round of talks in Sarajevo on 18 March 1992 (before war began), the three parties agreed to key principles of the Cutiliero Plan (as it became known) as a basis for further negotiations, but they did not sign the agreement.¹³⁸ Using results of the 1991 census, one study concluded that the plan would leave 60% of Croats, 18% of Muslims, and 50% of Serbs living in areas dominated by another nation.¹³⁹ Within a week, representatives of all three groups – the Bosnian Croats,

Bosnian Muslims, and Bosnian Serbs – distanced themselves from the plan. Cutiliero conducted further talks into July 1992 but failed to secure a breakthrough to end the war.¹⁴⁰

As ECCY-led talks proved fruitless, the United Nations first focused its attention on Sarajevo, particularly its airport, and the capital city's need for humanitarian aid. In Resolution 752 of 15 May 1992, the UN Security Council asked the Secretary General to review methods of ensuring "safe and secure access to Sarajevo airport."¹⁴¹ The secretary general, responding to the council's request, weighed the option of deploying UNPROFOR troops to provide "armed protection" for humanitarian convoys.¹⁴² That option, he reported, was fraught with risks. Without naming any party, he wrote,

In assessing the risk of hostile action, it has to be remembered that for some of the parties the infliction of hardship on civilians is actually a war aim, as it leads to the desired movements of population from certain areas.

Two weeks later in Resolution 757, the Security Council imposed sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Republics of Serbia and Montenegro) for its support of the Bosnian Serbs. It noted that "all parties bear some responsibility for the situation," but it deplored the "failure of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including the JNA," to implement its earlier resolution and regretted that "conditions have not yet been established for the effective and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance, including safe and secure access to and from Sarajevo."¹⁴³ Even though Bosnian Serb nationalist leaders agreed on 5 June 1992 to reopen the airport for humanitarian aid and to place their heavy weapons under UNPROFOR supervision, the Security Council's concern for free transit through the Sarajevo airport was repeated in subsequent resolutions through the summer of 1992.¹⁴⁴ Resolution 771 of 13 August 1992, going beyond concern for the airport, noted,

continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law including... deliberate attacks on noncombatants, hospitals, and ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian population, and wanton devastation and destruction of property.¹⁴⁵

On 24 August 1992, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, visited Sarajevo and other places in BiH to assess the human rights situation. In

his report submitted four days later, he concluded, "The greatest threat to life at present comes from the shelling of civilian population centers and the shooting of civilians in besieged towns."¹⁴⁶ He was alarmed that the besieging Serb forces were denying essential needs to Sarajevo's residents:

The siege, including the shelling of population centers and the cutting off of supplies of food and other essential goods, is another tactic ... The city is shelled on a regular basis, in what appears to be a deliberate attempt to spread terror among the population. Snipers shoot innocent civilians. The mission visited the hospital, and was able to see many civilian victims. It was also able to see the damage done to the hospital itself, which has been deliberately shelled on several occasions, despite the proper display of the internationally recognized Red Cross symbol.

Mazowiecki also noted that cultural centers had been targeted and that the airport, essential for the delivery of humanitarian aid, had been "among the principal targets of the shelling." In addition to the mosques and the Olympic Museum attacked in April, Serbian forces had destroyed the Oriental Institute¹⁴⁷ and attacked Muslim, Catholic, and even Serbian Orthodox religious institutions in the city in May through August. The day after his departure, Serb forces attacked the National and University Library and the offices of the daily newspaper, *Oslobodjenje*.¹⁴⁸ The library burned throughout the night, destroying most of its contents.¹⁴⁹

At the London Conference on 28 and 29 August 1992, the UN and EC combined their efforts for peace in BiH by forming the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). They appointed Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance as co-chairmen of the conference's steering committee and placed them in charge of the quest for peace.¹⁵⁰ At this conference, Karadžić agreed to put the VRS's heavy weapons in the hills above the city under international supervision, even as he denied that his forces were besieging Sarajevo.¹⁵¹ A few hours after the conference ended, Sarajevo was again subjected to mortar and artillery barrages that killed at least ten and wounded many more.¹⁵² Even after international observers were deployed, they did little more than monitor the number of shells the VRS was firing at the city below. As the assaults on Sarajevo continued, the co-chairmen worked throughout the autumn on a peace plan.

After several months of preliminary talks, Vance and Owen presented their peace plan (VOPP: Vance-Owen Peace Plan) to the leaders of the three nationalist parties in early January 1993. The VOPP called for ten provinces, three each with majorities of Croats, Serbs, and Muslims, and a tenth province, Sarajevo, to be shared by all three groups.¹⁵³ Croat representatives accepted the plan immediately, and Muslim negotiators acquiesced to it in late March 1993, but the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the plan after Serb voters had overwhelming voted against it in a special referendum in May 1993.

With the VOPP languishing in the absence of Bosnian Serb acquiescence, the United Nations Security Council continued to demand an end to attacks against Sarajevo and other besieged towns in BiH. Resolution 819 (16 April 1993) condemned the “deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of the civilian population from Srebrenica ... as well as from other parts of the Republic of BiH as part of its overall abhorrent campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing.’”¹⁵⁴ In Resolution 824, the Security Council called attention to the “urgent security and humanitarian needs” of several towns and noted,

the unique character of the city of Sarajevo, as a multicultural, multi-ethnic, and pluri-religious centre which exemplifies the viability of coexistence and interrelations between all the communities of the Republic of BiH, and of the need to preserve it and avoid its further destruction.

The resolution declared that Sarajevo and five other towns should be “treated as safe areas” and demanded “the immediate cessation of armed attacks ... and the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units from these towns to a distance where from they cease to constitute a menace to their security.”¹⁵⁵ Security Council Resolution 836 (4 June 1993) expanded UNPROFOR’s mandate beyond participating in the delivery of humanitarian aid “to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to occupy some key points on the ground.”¹⁵⁶ In each resolution, the Security Council emphasized that its demands were consistent with implementation of the VOPP.

In August 1993, Lord Owen and Stoltenberg (replacing Cyrus Vance, who had resigned in May) initiated a new peace plan to supersede the moribund VOPP.¹⁵⁷ The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, usually referred to as the Union of Three Republics, proposed to create three highly autonomous territorial units, one for each of BiH's three major nations.¹⁵⁸ Under the plan, Sarajevo would have come under UN administration. Owen and Stoltenberg won the acquiescence of negotiators for all three parties, but representatives in the Muslim-dominated Parliament of BiH in Sarajevo rejected the plan, concerned with the modest 30% of BiH's territory to be given to the Bosnian Muslim side. EU Action Plan of 8 November 1993 likewise involved autonomous territorial units defined on national lines.¹⁵⁹ It was the first of three plans, characterized by Lord Owen as "all basically of the same family,"¹⁶⁰ that made additional special provisions for the future status of Sarajevo.

The continuing diplomatic stalemate was brought to an end in February 1994 following a particularly deadly attack on Sarajevo. On 5 February 1994, a single shell landed in the midst of the busy Markale marketplace in downtown Sarajevo, killing 68 persons and wounding over 200. A UN investigation suggested that the VRS was likely the perpetrator of the attack, and world leaders reacted with outrage at the assault on civilians. The incident led the US to issue an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons from a twenty-kilometer "total exclusion zone" around Sarajevo or face NATO air attacks on Bosnian Serb positions. Russian diplomats, deepening their country's involvement in the crisis in BiH, brokered a compromise providing for the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the exclusion zone in exchange for deployment of a Russian detachment to UNPROFOR. Although the Bosnian Serb nationalists complied slowly and reluctantly, they eventually withdrew their heavy weapons from the exclusion zone.

ICFY efforts for peace were complicated by the outbreak of full-scale war between Croat and Muslim armed forces in April 1993. The war between the former allies alarmed US policy-makers, who urged the two sides to end the fighting and form a shared territorial unit. A US-led initiative resulted in Muslim and Croat leaders signing the Washington Agreement in March 1994, creating the "Federation of BiH" made up of ten "cantons." The agreement specified that

Sarajevo would be the capital of the Federation and one of its ten cantons. In its first year the agreement produced little more than a cease-fire and the Federation was at first an empty vessel, but it proved decisive in redirecting the energies of the ARBiH and HVO against their common adversary, the VRS.¹⁶¹

After the Bosnian Serb nationalists had withdrawn their heavy weapons from the exclusion zone and the Washington Agreement was reached by Serb and Croat leaders, Owen and Stoltenberg formed the Contact Group, consisting of the US, UK, France, Germany, and Russia, to expedite negotiations. The Contact Group soon superseded the ICFY as the principal agency negotiating a peace agreement, but its first plan was rebuffed by the Bosnian Serb nationalists.¹⁶² As of August 1994, the Contact Group remained on the table, but the Bosnian Serbs continued to reject modified variants of the plan. Not until summer 1995 did further developments move the parties toward a final cease-fire and result in a negotiated end to the war and siege in November 1995.

Conclusion

Geography, demographic change, political development, and the Bosnian Serb nationalists' strategy all played a role in creating conditions that led to the siege of Sarajevo. The city developed in a narrow east-west valley, making it vulnerable to bombardment and attack from hills to the north and south. Serb villages, clustered in the mountains of peripheral municipalities that were annexed to the city in the 1970s, came in the 1990s to provide support for the SDS campaign to separate from the city of Sarajevo. Bosnian Serb nationalists and their military allies (the JNA and its successor, the VRS) drew upon those Serb-dominated rural areas to prepare and support the siege from 1991 to 1995. Bosnian Serb leaders used their military and geographic advantages to shell Sarajevo periodically, to damage and destroy its cultural and religious monuments, and to deprive its civilian population of food, water, electricity, gas, and transportation. The city's diminished population became dependent on international humanitarian assistance to sustain life. Widespread starvation was averted owing to the efforts of UNPROFOR and the ingenuity of Sarajevo's defenders. In February 1994, after two years of

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fruitless negotiations and rejected peace plans, international diplomats achieved an agreement that brought the city a respite in shelling by heavy weapons. However, the siege itself continued, and neither armed resistance by the ARBiH nor international pressure succeeded in ending the VRS's encirclement and isolation of Sarajevo until late in 1995.

¹ Election results are found in Suad Arnautović, *Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini '90. Analiza izbornog procesa* (Elections in BiH 1990: Analysis of the electoral process) (Sarajevo: Promocult, 1996), pp. 103-127.

² The local term "narod" means "people" or "nation," but is most comparable to the English-language term "ethnic group" or "nationality." "Narod," as used in socialist Yugoslavia, had a specific meaning as the highest level of group recognition. The "narodnost" (literally, nationality) was of lesser status than the "narod," and beneath the "narodnost" in status was "manjina" (minority). Bosnian Muslims, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Slovenes and Serbs were recognized as members of a "narod" in the SFRJ's constitution of 1974.

³ Robin Okey, "Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian? Language and Nationality in the Lands of the Former Yugoslavia," *East European Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 4 (January 2005), pp. 419-441, describes changing relationship of Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian over time.

⁴ Ronelle Alexander, *Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian: A Grammar with Sociolinguistic Commentary* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), p. 379.

⁵ Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 6.

⁶ Duško Milidragović, *Komunalno uređenje grada Sarajeva* (Communal structure of the city of Sarajevo) (Sarajevo: Službeni list SRBiH, 1984), p. 102. Population statistics are taken from the 1991 census, as reported in: Republika Hrvatska. Državni zavod za statistiku, *Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine; Narodnosni sastav po naseljima* (Zagreb: Državni zavod za statistiku, 1991), p. 15 (hereafter Državni zavod. *Stanovništvo BiH*.)

⁷ "Zajednički život" and "suživot" were terms commonly used by Bosnians until 1991. After the arrival of international peacekeepers and other foreigners during the Yugoslav wars, Bosnians came to use the term "multiethnic life" more frequently to refer to the same phenomenon. I have elaborated on the concepts of common life and neighborliness in Robert J. Donia, *Sarajevo: A Biography* (London: Hurst; Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), pp. 2-5.

⁸ In 1977, the Novo Sarajevo municipality was divided in two. One resulting municipality continued to bear the name Novo Sarajevo, while the other was designated Novi grad. By 1991, the population of these two municipalities combined reached 231,705, more than double the population of 111,811 on the same territory in 1971. Državni zavod, *Stanovništvo BiH*, p. 15.

⁹ Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 180.

¹⁰ In Sarajevo, SDA candidate Muhamed Kreševljaković was selected as president of the city assembly; SDS member Maksim Stanišić was named president of the executive committee, and

the HDZ's Aleksandra Balvanović was designated vice president of the city assembly. On 20 December 1990, the city assembly confirmed these selections, which representatives of the three nationalist parties had agreed upon in advance, over the objections of the Left Bloc opposition consisting principally of the Reformists and the Social Democrats. *Oslobodjenje*, 21 December 1990, p. 10.

¹¹ Raif Dizdarević, *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije. Svjedočenja* (From the death of Tito to the death of Yugoslavia: Testimony) (Sarajevo: Biblioteka Svjedok, 1999), p. 295. "Today in Yugoslavia there exists a real fear of hegemonism, and separatism is also very real," he wrote. Dizdarević was foreign minister of the SFRJ for six years before becoming a member of the Federal Presidency and eventually the president of the Federal Presidency.

¹² *Oslobodjenje*, 21 December 1990, p. 10. "Sarajevo je u ovom momentu u nezavidnom političkom položaju i sa mnogo komunalnih problema. Očito je da ne živi kao jedinstvena gradska cjelina, pošto ima mnogo opština, i sve je to rascjepkano."

¹³ *Glas* (Voice) (Banja Luka), 27 and 28 April 1991, p. 6, and *Oslobodjenje*, 27 April 1991, p. 4. Together, *Glas* and *Oslobodjenje* provide invaluable information on the local situation in their respective areas, Banja Luka and Sarajevo.

¹⁴ *Javnost* (Public) (Sarajevo), 4 May 1991, p. 2. *Javnost* was the official publication of the SDS in BiH; it commenced publication in October 1990 and appeared biweekly. The SDS delegates justified their decision by accusing the Sarajevo city government of neglecting Pale's economic welfare and instead promoting tourism in other municipalities.

¹⁵ Srdjan Radulović, *Sudbina Krajine* (The fate of the Krajina) (Belgrade: Dan Graf, 1996), p. 17. The Community of Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika (Zajednica opština sjeverne Dalmacije i Like) consisted of the municipalities of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Donji Lapac, Gračac, and (Titova) Korenica.

¹⁶ Milošević directed Karadžić to mobilize Bosnian Serb reservists in telephone conversations on 9 July 1991 and 23 September 1991. ICTY, Case IT-02-54, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Exhibit P613, Tabs 4 and 74. English ERNs 0308-6323 – 0308-6325 and ET 0212-8746 – 0212-8751; BCS ERNs 0206-6204 – 0206-6207 and 0212-8746 – 0212-8751.

¹⁷ Radulović, *Sudbina Krajine*, p. 36.

¹⁸ SDS bodies proclaimed and ratified formation of the SAOs through the fall of 1991. SDS Main Board recommended the formation of SAO's at its session on 7 September 1991. "Odluku o imenovanju štaba za regionalizaciju, Srpska demokratska stranka BiH, Gradski odbor, Sarajevo. Broj: 01-37-1/91." (Decision on naming a staff for regionalization, Serb Democratic Party of BiH, city committee, Sarajevo. No. 01-37-1/91.) Sarajevo, 25 September 1991. BCS ERN SA02-1150. Beginning in mid-September 1991, four SAOs were publicly proclaimed: Romanija-Birač, Hercegovina, Semberija, and Northern Bosnia. The Assembly of the Serb

People of BiH ratified these announcements at its second session on 21 November 1991, in the “Decision on the Verification of the proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” English ERN 0093-0319. The decision was published shortly thereafter in *Javnost*, 7 December 1991, p. 10, in an article that simultaneously announced the proclamation of a fifth SAO, the “Serbian Autonomous Region of Bosnian Krajina,” a renaming of the “Community of Municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina” that had been declared in April 1991.

¹⁹ Some SDS documents refer to this SAO as “Romanija-Birač,” while others call it simply “Romanija.” See, for example, *Javnost*, 21 September 1991, p. 5, which refers to the proclamation of SAO Romanija. In December 1991, Romanija and Birač became two distinct SAOs (see p. 9 of this report), but even thereafter some documents referred to an SAO Romanija-Birač..

²⁰ Ivo Žanić, *Flag on the Mountain: A Political Anthropology of the War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-1995* (London: Saqi, 2007), trans. Graham McMaster with Celia Hawkesworth, pp. 211-214.

²¹ “Odluku o imenovanju štaba za regionalizaciju.” BCS ERN SA02-1150.

²² “Shorthand notes of the Second Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 21 November 1991.” English ERN 0093-0319. (Hereafter, citations to these assembly transcripts are identified as “Bosnian Serb Assembly” followed by session number, date, and ERN.) SAO Romanija-Birač consisted of the municipalities Han Pijesak, Pale, Sokolac, Vlasenica, and Šekovići, “and parts of other municipalities from this region with a majority Serb population with their seat in Sarajevo.” English ERN 0093-0319. “kao i dijelovi drugih opština sa ove regije sa većinskim srpskim narodom sa sjedištem u Sarajevu.” BCS ERN SA01-2031 – SA01-2030 (pages are out of order). The official gazette’s version of this decision listed two additional areas as part of SAO Romanija-Birač: Olovo Municipality and parts of the Rogatica Municipality. *Službeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Official Gazette of the Serb people in BiH) Year 1 – Number 1, Sarajevo, 15 January 1992. BCS ERN SA01-0636; English ERN 0044-8160. Cited hereafter as “*Official Gazette of the Serb People in BiH*.”

²³ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 2nd Session, 21 November 1991. English ERN 0093-0319 – 0093-0320; BCS ERN SA01-2030. “Status opština u gradu Sarajevu kao i dijelova grada Sarajeva u kojima srpski narod predstavlja većinu urediće se posebnom odlukom.” SDS Party President, speaking in December 1991, stated, “We have exact data now which show that Sarajevo can not only have an extraterritorial status, but also that Serb Sarajevo, that is, the Serb part of Sarajevo, has its continuing existence and it is the center of the Serb Autonomous Region of Romanija and Birač. ... Serb Sarajevo has its territory and is a territorial unit within the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but we can make a deal.” Bosnian Serb Assembly, 4th Session, 21 December 1991.” English ERN 0093-9677 – 0093-9678. “Sada imamo precizne podatke i Sarajevo može ne čak da ima eksteritorijalnost, nego prije svega srpsko Sarajevo, srpski dio Sarajeva, ima svoj kontinuitet and ovdje je sjedište Srpske autonomni oblasti Romanija i Birač.

Srpsko Sarajevo ima svoju teritoriju i svoju autonomnu zajednicu u sklopu Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, ali možemo da se dogovorimo.” BCS ERN SA02-5146.

²⁴ “Skupština srpske autonomne oblasti ‘Romanija.’ Pale, 11.12.1991. godine. Zapisnik” (Record of the meeting of the Autonomous District ‘Romanija’ held in Pale, 11 December 1991). BCS ERN SA02-3688 – SA02-3692; English ERN not available to me. The Sarajevo representatives complained that the “Birač” designation was added in the SAO’s initial formulation because SDS representatives from eastern Bosnia had dallied in proclaiming their own SAO.

²⁵ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 34th Session, 11 September 1993. BCS ERN 0215-0896; English ERN not available to me. “Svaki naš potez je bio izazvan nekim Izetbegovićem potezom. ... Oni urade nešto, mi uradimo nešto.”

²⁶ “Platform Predsjedništva Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine” (Platform of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of BiH) and “Deklaracija” (Declaration). *Oslobodjenje*, 15 October 1991, p. 3.

²⁷ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), p. 216. This event was covered in all media in BiH, and the legality or illegality of the HDZ-SDA maneuver has been debated ever since.

²⁸ “SDS Savjet stranke, 18:00 to 21:30. Srpska demokratska stranka Bosne i Hercegovine. Datum: 15.10.1991.godine” (SDS Council of the party, 18:00 to 21:30. Serb Democratic Party of BiH. Date: 15.10.1991). BCS ERN SA02-3844 - SA02-3848; English ERN 0304-4271 – 0304-4274. BCS version contains the handwritten notation, “Postoji original u rukopisu” (Original is hand-written).

²⁹ “Decision on Establishing the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *Official Gazette of the Ser People in BiH* Year I – Number 1, 15 January 1992, pp. 1-2. English ERN 0044-8141. See also *Yugoslav Survey* 1 (1992), p. 125, and *Oslobodjenje*, 10 November 1991, p. 5.

³⁰ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 2nd Session, 21 November 1991. BCS ERN SA01-2012 – SA01 – 2016; English ERN 0093-0303 – 0093-0311; and *Oslobodjenje*, 6 November 1991, p. 5.

³¹ Assembly members objected to creating parallel institutions in all municipalities, arguing that such action would disrupt existing cooperative arrangements with other nationalist parties and that Muslims might retaliate by organizing similar bodies in Serb-majority municipalities. The assembly passed unanimously a recommendation to establish Serb municipal assemblies, “adding that the cover letter would specify that this is recommended where necessary, and should in no case be across the board, because the latter would be unnecessary.” Bosnian Serb Assembly, 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. English ERN 0093-3341. “dobajući da će se u popratnom pismu reći da se to preporučuje tamo gdje je to nužno, ni u kom slučaju da to bude

linearno jer bi to u svakom slučaju bilo bespotrebno.” BCS ERN 0089-8274. The resolution was published as the "Recommendation on Establishing Municipal Assemblies of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Official Gazette of the Serb People in BiH*, Year I – Number 1, 15 January 1992. BCS ERN SA01-0637; English ERN 0044-8165;

³² “Srpska demokratska stranka Bosne i Hercegovine. Glavni odbor. Strogo povjerljivo. Uputstvo o organizovanju i djelovanju organa srpskog narodu u Bosni i Hercegovini u vanrednim okolnostima, Sarajevo, 19. decembra 1991. godine.” (Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Main Board. Instructions for the Organization and Activity of the Organs of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances, Sarajevo, 19 December 1991), Copy number 096 (the number is handwritten), from the Sarajevo Municipality of Trnovo, BCS ERN 0227-9644 – 0227-9653, English ERN ET 0227-9644 – 0227-9653. The OTP has acquired several copies of this document from the Sarajevo area, numbered 93, 96, 100, and 104, to be found in Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Exhibit P529, Tabs 23, 27, 28, 34, and 35. (The handwritten number on individual copies seems to indicate the SDS Municipal Board to which the document is addressed.)

³³ Ibid, English pp. 3, 4, 7, and 8; BCS ERNs 0227-9646, 0227-9649, and 0337-9650. “krizni štab srpskog naroda” and “sazvati i proglasiti skupštinu srpskog naroda.” .

³⁴ Ibid, English p. 8, BCS ERN 0227-9650. “U mjesnim zajednicama ili naseljenim mjestima sa većinskim srpskim stanovništvom formirati tajna skladišta i depoe u koje smještati živežne namirnice i druge deficitarne proizvode, sirovine i repromaterijale koje treba maksimalno izvlačiti putem tajnih kazala iz skladišta robnih rezervi svih nivoa, kao i iz skladišta u okviru prometnih organizacija.” .

³⁵ Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Exhibit P529, Tab 43, BCS ERN SA02-6744; English ERN ET SA02-6744. In March 1992 the Sarajevo weekly publication *Slobodna Bosna* published the “instructions” in full, along with the minutes of the Sarajevo Crisis Staff meeting and a list of its participants. *Slobodna Bosna*, 12 March 1992, p. 3.

³⁶ *Oslobodjenje*, 25 December 1991, p. 7. The vote was the result of persistent and ultimately successful efforts by SDS leaders to win the votes of Bosnian Serbs from the non-nationalist opposition parties. HDZ and SDA delegates walked out of the assembly when the item was placed on the agenda, whereupon the Serb delegates approved the resolution to join SAO Romanija without opposition.

³⁷ Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Exhibit P529, Tab 53, “Odluka o proglašenju srpske skupštine opštine Ilidža. Br. 6/92, 3 januar 1992” (Decision on proclamation of the Serb Municipal Assembly of Ilidža number 6/92, 3 January 1992). BCS ERN SA02-4139 – SA02-4140; English ERN ET SA02-4139 – SA02-4140. Further instances of the instructions of 19 December being implemented in Sarajevo are found in P529, Tabs 27, 48, 56, 371, 377, 378, 379, and 451.

³⁸ *Oslobodjenje*, 11 January 1992, p. 12.

³⁹ *Oslobodjenje*, 15 January 1992, p. 8, and 20 March 1992, p. 8.

⁴⁰ In the Stari grad municipality of the City of Sarajevo, in which Muslims made up the majority, a Serb Municipal Assembly was formed in the café “Two Doves,” principally by those living outside the area, on 22 February. “Insofar as we can’t live together, we can only live beside one another,” said Kosta Plakalović, the elected President of the miniscule Serbian Assembly of Old Town. *Oslobodjenje*, 23 February 1992, p. 5.

⁴¹ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 12th Session, 24 March 1992, English ERN 0300-2043.

⁴² Bosnian Serb Assembly, 12th Session, 24 March 1992.” The assembly rendered a “Decision on the Verification of Decisions on the Proclamation of Newly Established Serb Municipalities” that included 35 municipalities. The Chairperson noted that “the establishment of Serb municipalities ... must be completed and done properly, in accordance with our constitution.” He further noted that “all the presidents of autonomous districts had received instructions and should have prepared and organized this. Those who have not done it should do so by Friday.” The assembly unanimously endorsed his directive. English ERNs 0300-2049 – 0030-2050; BCS ERNs SA01-1162 – SA01-1163.

⁴³ *Oslobodjenje*, 24 January 1992, p. 11. The paper reported that monthly revenues of approximately 50,000 German marks would thenceforth be retained in Pale.

⁴⁴ *Oslobodjenje*, 29 January 1992, p. 4.

⁴⁵ *Oslobodjenje*, 5 March 1992, p. 4.

⁴⁶ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 50th Session, English ERN 0096-9865. “U trenutku kada je počeo rat, mi smo imali u opštinama gdje je većina vlast opštinsku, čvrsto je držali, sve kontrolisali. U opštinama gdje smo bili manjiha [sic] formiranu tajnu vlasti, opštinski odbor, opštinsku skupštinu, predsjednika izvršnog odbora. To su bile sećate se A ili B, varijante. U B varijantama gdje smo bili u manjini 20%, 15% imali smo vlast uspostavljenu i brigadu, jedinicu i tamo, kolika da je ali odred je bio tamo i komandant.” BCS ERN 0084-6058. The president of Jajce municipality in north-central BiH recalled receiving instructions on the A and B variants in a speech to the Bosnian Serb Assembly, 33rd Session, 21 July 1993, BCS ERNs 0215-0470 – 0215-0471.

⁴⁷ Marko Hoare, *How Bosnia Armed* (London: Saqi Books, 2004), pp. 29-31, describes the origins of the Patriotic League. On 10 June some 356 Muslim representatives selected by the SDA gathered and formed the Council for National Defense of the Muslim Nation with the Patriotic League as its military arm. Branka Magaš i Ivo Žanić (eds.), *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini, 1991-1995* (Zagreb-Sarajevo: Dani, 1999), p. 378, and *Oslobodjenje*, 15 June 1991, p. 4. By January 1992 it was organized in several locations and held periodic inspections. *Oslobodjenje*, 12 January 1999, p. 13.

⁴⁸ Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), p. 254. On 26 March 1992 the Croatian ZNG carried out a particularly brutal cross-border attack and killed 12 Bosnian Serbs from five different families near Bosanski Brod in BiH. *Oslobodjenje*, 28 March 1992, p. 1, and 29 March 1992, p. 1. Momčilo Krajišnik told the Assembly of the Serbian People of BiH on 27 March 1992 that three Serbian families had been slaughtered in the village of Sjekovac and ten Territorial Defense members had died in the clash. "HOS members gathered the bodies of the dead and dumped them into the Sava River today around noontime," he told delegates. Bosnian Serb Assembly, 14th Session, 27 March 1992. English ERN 0092-6786. "u selu Sjekovac zaklane tri srpske porodice, da je u obračunu poginula deset teritorijalaca. Danas oko podneva pripadnici HOS-a pokupili tijela poginulih i bacili ih u Savu." BCS ERN 0090-8381.

⁴⁹ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, p. 254. "In Serbia the powerful internal security policy supported Milošević and the Socialist party. All the major parties and renegades created their own armies: The Chetniks of Serbian Radical party leader Vojislav Šešelj; the Serbian Guard of Vuk Drašković's Serbian Movement for Renewal; and the White Eagles, Dušan Silni, and the Serbian Volunteer Guard (also known as Arkanovci or Tigers) organized by Željko Raznatović-Arkan." Woodward asserts that twenty different paramilitary groups were operating in BiH by June 1991.

⁵⁰ Article 240 stated, "The Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the social system of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia established by the present Constitution." *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: Yugoslovenski pregled, 1989), p. 115.

⁵¹ Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise*, trans. Sabrina P. Ramet (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 213, argues convincingly that the transformation of the JNA was completed first in Croatia and only later in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

⁵² *Oslobodjenje*, 30 September 1991, p. 3.

⁵³ *Oslobodjenje*, 1 October 1991, p. 1.

⁵⁴ One delegate told the Serbian Assembly in December 1991, "I also want to draw attention of my honourable colleague Mr. Brdjanin to the fact that the Serbian people of Romanija have been mobilized and ready for a long time. I emphasize this because there are lots of our folk watching us in Vojvodina, Belgrade and across Serbia. Our special forces have proved themselves in Vukovar, at Tripinjska Cesta Road, and in Borovo Naselje. I would like to use this opportunity to congratulate my folk from Romanija again. And tomorrow, I invite you all to Han Pijesak to celebrate the successes of the folk from Romanija in liberating Vukovar." Bosnian Serb Assembly, 4th Session, 21 December 1991." English ERN 0093-9663. "Zelim istaći i primjedbu uvaženom kolegi Brdjaninu da je srpski narod s Romanije odavno mobilisan i spreman a ovo govorim iz razloga što nas prati dosta naših zemljaka u Vojvodini, Beogradu i širom Srbije. To smo dokazali našim specijalnim jedinicama na Vukovaru, na Trbinskoj cesti, u Borovu naselju. I

ovom prilikom mojim Romanijcima želim još jedanput da čestitam. A sutra vas ovo pozivam u Han-Pijesak da prodlavimo uspjehe Romanijaca u oslobađanju Vukovara.“ BCS ERNs SA02-5116 – SA02-5117.

⁵⁵ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter, 1992), pp. 46-47.

⁵⁶ “Informacija o akciji sigurnijeg obezbjedjenja naoružanja i municije TO SRBIH, dostavlja. Republički Stab teritorijalne odbrane Predsjedništvu SRBiH, Sarajevo, 13 septembar 1990 (Information on action for increased security of weapons and munitions of the Territorial Defense of the Socialist Republic of BiH, presented by the Republic Staff of Territorial Defense to the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of BiH, Sarajevo, 13 September 1990),” BCS ERN 0087-0220 – 0087-0235.

⁵⁷ Veljko Kadrijević, *Moje Vidjenje Raspada: Vojska bez države* (My view of the collapse: Army without a state) (Beograd: Politika, 1993), p. 147. “Pošto naponi JNA da i muslimanski dio rukovodstva Bosne i Hercegovine usmeri ka novoj jugoslovenskoj državi onih jugoslovenskih naroda koji to zaista hoće nisu urodili plodom, to smo se mi morali orijentisati na konkretnu saradnju sa predstavnicima srpskoga naroda i sa srpskim narodom u cijelini, nikaka ne zatvarajući vrata za saradnju i sa ostalima, makar pojedincima koji su na novu Jugoslaviju. Time smo obezbjedili da za vrijeme rata u Hrvatskoj vršimo manevar i pokrete snagama JNA preko Bosne i Hercegovine, što je za JNA bilo od vitalnog značaja. ... Procjenjujući dalji razvoj događaja smatrali smo da nakon napustanja Hrvatske, u BiH treba imati jake snage JNA.”

⁵⁸ *Oslobodjenje*, 8 November 1991, p. 7.

⁵⁹ *Oslobodjenje*, 9 November 1991, p. 8, and 15 November 1991, p. 3.

⁶⁰ “Sarajevo na četničkom nišanu” (“Sarajevo as the Chetnik target”), *Slobodna Bosna*, 21 November 1991, p. 3.

⁶¹ *Oslobodjenje*, 3 December 1991, p. 7; 5 December 1991, p. 8; and 6 December 1991, p. 7.

⁶² Borisav Jović, *Poslednji dani SFRJ* (drugo izdanje) (The last days of Yugoslavia; second edition) (Kragujevac: Prizma, 1996), p. 420. Milošević anticipated that several Yugoslav Republics would shortly be recognized as independent states, according to Jović’s notes, and the Serbian President made different plans for Macedonia than for BiH. “If Macedonia wishes to separate, we must reach an agreement with them for a withdrawal of the army and the division of military property.”

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 421.

⁶⁵ Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, p. 218.

⁶⁶ *Oslobodjenje*, 5 January 1992, p. 4.

⁶⁷ Kukanjac outlined in some detail the progress in relocating JNA assets in Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Exhibit P51, "Zaključci iz procene stanja na prostoru BiH u zoni odgovornosti 2. VO. Mart, 1992. godine." (Conclusions based on assessments of the situation in the territory of BiH in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Military District. March 1992) Signed by Milutin Kukanjac, Komandant, General-pukovnik; illegible stamp, BCS ERN 0106-5518 – 0106-5530; and Exhibit P51.1. This document was also published in Hasan Efendić, *Ko je branio Bosnu* (Who defended Bosnia?) (Sarajevo: Oko, 1998), pp. 45-54.

⁶⁸ "General Milutin Kukanjac. Moja istina," *NIN*, 6 January 2000, p. 57. "Mi smo pravovremeno otpočeli sa izmeštanjem celokupne pokretne imovine u vlasništvu JNA; ... u izvanrednoj organizaciji mi smo izvukli, spasili i zadržali sve; u ruke muslimansko-hrvatskih hordi nije pao ni jedan jedini avion, helikopter, tenk, oklopni transporter, top, minobacač, motorno vozilo."

⁶⁹ Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Exhibits P1001, BCS ERN SA03-5899 – SA03-5900; and P1001.1, English ERN ET SA03-5899 – SA03-5900.

⁷⁰ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 50th Session, April 1995. English ERN 0096-9865. "Izvršena je disperzija oružja zahvaljujući JNA, izvuklo se što se mogao izvući i rasulo po srpskim prostorima i podjelo narodu, ali narod je organizovala SDS i stvorila vojsku, to je bila vojska." BCS ERN 0084-6058.

⁷¹ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, p. 168. A cease-fire had been signed and the JNA had agreed to withdraw from Slovenia on July 1, but hostilities resumed thereafter and ended only after the Brioni Agreement was signed. Daniel Bethlehem and Marc Weller (eds.), *The 'Yugoslav' Crisis in International Law: General Issues*, Part I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. xxviii.

⁷² Steve Terrett, *The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission: A contextual study of peace-making efforts in the post-Cold War world* (Ashgate: Dartmouth, 2000), pp. 80-82 and 141-163.

⁷³ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, p. 276, and James Gow, *The Triumph of the Lack of Will* (London: Hurst, and New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 63.

⁷⁴ *Oslobodjenje*, 21 December 1991, pp. 1 and 3.

⁷⁵ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 4th Session, 21 December 1991, "Decision on the Establishment of the Republic of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina," English ERN 0093-9650 – 0093-9651; BCS ERNs SA02-5089 – SA-2-5090. Article 2 of this decision cited the plebiscite of November 1991 as authority to move forward with establishing a separate republic.

⁷⁶ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 5th Session, 9 January 1992, English ERN L004-6789, and *Oslobodjenje*, 10 January 1992, p. 8.

⁷⁷ For the Badinter Commission decision, see "Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 4 on International Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the European Community and its Member States," *International Legal Materials*, Vol. XXXI, No. 6, Nov. 1992, pp. 1501-1503 ; Snežana Trifunovska, ed., *Yugoslavia Through Documents. From its Creation through its Dissolution*. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1994), Item 154, pp. 486-488; *Yugoslav Survey*, vol. 32, no. 4 (1991), pp. 124-125, and commentary in Terrett, *The Dissolution of Yugoslavia*, p. 164.

⁷⁸ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 6th Session, 26 January 1992. English ERN 0301-8049 – 0301-8050.

⁷⁹ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 7th Session, 15 February 1992. English ERN 0110-5039 – 0110-5092. A draft of the constitution was discussed extensively at this session. Adoption of the constitution was planned for 25 February 1992 but postponed. Bosnian Serb Assembly, 8th Session, 25 February 1992. English ERN 0084-0447. It was eventually approved on 28 February 1992. Bosnian Serb Assembly, 9th Session, 28 February 1992. English ERN 0110-9190.

⁸⁰ *Official Gazette of the Serb People in BiH*, Year 1, number 3, Sarajevo, 16 March 1992, p. 1. "Član 1: Srpska Republika Bosna i Hercegovina je država srpskog naroda i gradjana koji i njoj žive."

⁸¹ For referendum results, see *Oslobodjenje*, 4 March 1992, p. 1.

⁸² Victor Meier, then a correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, was in the area when the fatal shooting occurred. Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise*, p. 211. See also *Oslobodjenje*, 3 March 1992, p. 12. The same publication subsequently revealed that the perpetrator, Ramiz Delalić, had been implicated in an earlier shooting and a rape and had received treatment at the Sarajevo Psychiatric Hospital. *Oslobodjenje*, 6 March 1992, p. 8.

⁸³ The agreement and dismantling of the barricades are recalled by Kukanjac, "Moja istina," p. 58, and were reported in *Oslobodjenje*, 3 March 1992, p. 1, and 4 March 1992, p. 2. Kukanjac recalled that he had visited 12 Serb barricades and 2 Muslim ones; the Sarajevo newspaper credited him with visiting 14 Serb barricades and 7 Muslim ones.

⁸⁴ *Oslobodjenje*, 4 March 1992, p. 2.

⁸⁵ Donia, *Sarajevo: A Biography*, pp.279-282, describes the Valter movement.

⁸⁶ Kukanjac told an interviewer for the BBC, "They were shaking their fists in each other's faces. I had to break it up!" After the agreement was reached, SDA Party President Izetbegović stated,

“We agreed to protect our citizens with joint patrols. They’ll be run by the federal army and our Bosnian police.” *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (video), Part IV.

⁸⁷ Kukanjac, “My Guest – My Truth” TV show, Pale TV, 12 July 1994.

⁸⁸ Kristijan A. Nilsen, “Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova bosanskih Srba: Geneza, učinak, komanda i kontrola, 1990-1992” (Ministry of the Interior of the Bosnian Serbs: Origins, actions, command, and control, 1990-1992), in Sonja Biserko (ed.), *Milosevic vs. Jugoslavija*, knjiga I (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2004), paragraph 64 and footnote 90, pp. 312-313. Christian Nielsen prepared this report for the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY. It was admitted into evidence in the case of *The Prosecutor vs. Slobodan Milošević*.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, paragraph 71, p. 315.

⁹⁰ *Oslobodjenje*, 20 March 1992, p. 8.

⁹¹ “Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina, Ministarstvo za unutrašnje poslove, Sarajevo. Izjava milicionara muslimanske nacionalnosti o njihovim udaljavanju iz SJB Pale i SJB Sokolac, 24. mart 1992. godine” (Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of the Interior, Sarajevo. Statements by policemen of Muslim nationality about their removal from the Pale and Sokolac Public Security Stations, 24 March 1992). BCS ERNs 0204-8150 – 0204-8151; English ERNs 0302-6252 – 0302-6253.

⁹² *Oslobodjenje*, 26 March 1992, p. 20. “u skladu sa odlukom ‘Vlade SAO Romanija’ koja je dala naredbu.”

⁹³ “Pomoćnik ministra za unutrašnje poslove Momčilo Mandić MUP SRBiH UZSK, broj 02-2482,” 31 marta 1992, br. 2482 (Deputy Minister of the Interior Momčilo Mandić to MUP SR BiH UZSK, no. 2482, 31 March 1992), BCS ERNs 0049-0125 – 0049-0125; English ERNs 0085-9466 – 0085-9467.

⁹⁴ The events of the weekend are summarized in “Narod branio grad: hronologija sarajevske drame” (The people defended the city: A chronology of the Sarajevo drama), *Oslobodjenje*, 8 April 1992, p. 4.

⁹⁵ “Annexes to the Final Report of Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992). Volume II – Annex VI, Part 1,” p. 153. (Hereafter “UN Commission of Experts”) See also Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, p. 229, and *NIN* (Belgrade), 2 December 1999, p. 60.

⁹⁶ UN Commission of Experts, p. 154.

⁹⁷ “Odluka o formiranju Hrvatskog vijeća obrane” (Decision on forming the Croatian Defense Council), *Narodni list HZ Herceg-Bosna*, 1 (1992), p. 4.

⁹⁸ *Oslobodjenje*, 16 April 1992, p. 1.

⁹⁹ Kadrijević, *Moje vidjenje raspada*, p. 148. “Komande i jedinice JNA su činile kičmu vojske Republike Srpske sa kompletnim naoružanjem i opremom.” (Italics in original.)

¹⁰⁰ ICTY, IT-02-54, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Exhibit P613, Tab 48 (BCS) and 48a (English). “Mi je Romanija javila da se oni pripremaju da blokiraju Sarajevo, niko iz Sarajeva izaći neće moći.” BCS ERN 0206-6176, English draft translation of 0206-6173 – 0206-6176.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Tab 50 (BCS) and 50a (English). “Iz Sarajeva neće moći niko izaći ni jednim pravcem. Ni jednim pravcem neće niko moći.” BCS ERN 0211-6619; English ERN 0302-7829.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, Tab 88 (BCS) and 88a (English). Intercept, Karadžić and Gojko Djogo, 12 October 1991. English ERNs ET 0212-8922 – 0121-8935, pp. 7 and 8 of 17. “Oni ne shvataju ...kako Srbi ključaju, kako se Srbi sporo pale , a dugo gore ... Oni moraju da znaju čoveće oko Sarajeva ima 20,000 naoružanih Srba, pa to nije normalno, pa on će, oni će nestati. Sarajevo će biti karakazan u kome će izginuti 300,000 Muslimani. ... Šta vi mislite da se možete, da se otcijepite kao Hrvatska.” BCS ERN 0212-8927; On the long-standing friendship between Djoko and Karadžić, see Gojko Djogo, “Vunena vremena Radovanova,” in Ljiljana Bulatović, *Radovan* (Belgrade: Evro, 2002), pp. 105-109.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* “...on može da ima vlast u pola Sarajeva, u Zenici, i u pola Tuzle, i naime, gotovo je ... Oni to ne shvataju da bi tu, bili krvi do koljena i da bi Muslimanski narod nestao...”

¹⁰⁴ ICTY, IT-00-39 and 40, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Exhibit P67A, Tab 11 (English) and 11.1 (BCS). Krajišnik and Karadžić. 4 September 1991. English ERN 0302-7801. “Ma ne, treba reći nestaćemo svi, obadvoje, znaš. ... To namjerno treba reći.” BCS ERN 0207-9141.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, Exhibit P69 (videotape), ERN V000-0270. “Nemojte da mislite da nećete odvesti Bosni i Hercegovinu u pakao a muslimanski narod možda u nestanak, jer muslimanski narod ne može da se odbrani ako bude rat ovdje.”

¹⁰⁶ “SDS Savjet stranke, 18:00 to 21:30. Srpska demokratska stranka Bosne i Hercegovine English ERN 0304-4271 – 0304-4274. “Srpska vlada sa sjedištem u Sarajevu ... koja bi povezala sve naše regije.” BCS ERN SA02-3844 – SA02-3845.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, BCS ERN SA02-3847 – SA02-3848, or 0055-1721 – 0055-1722.

¹⁰⁸ *Oslobodjenje*, 1 November 1991, p. 8.

¹⁰⁹ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 4th Session, 21 December 1991." English ERN 0093-9677. "Čini mi se da sada kada je ovoliko nepovjerenje treba ići na što više razdvajanja pa neka poslije život i ekonomije, ekonomski rezoni spajaju." BCS SA02-5146.

¹¹⁰ ICTY, IT-98-34-T, Prosecutor v. Mladen Natetilić, aka 'Tuta,' and Vinko Martinović, aka 'Štela,' Exhibit PT-3.

¹¹¹ *Oslobodjenje*, 17 April 1992, p. 8, reporting on "Dnevnik," TV Sarajevo.

¹¹² Bosnian Serb Assembly, 16th Session, 12 May 1992. English ERN 0091-3513. "strateške prioritete srpskog naroda, odnosno stratske ciljeve srpskog naroda..." BCS ERN 0214-9446. The six strategic goals were published in November 1993 in the official gazette. "Odluku o strateškim ciljevima srpskog naroda u BiH" (Decision on the strategic goals of the Serb people in BiH). *Službeni Glasnik Republike Srpske*, no. 22, 26 Novembra 1993, p. 866.

¹¹³ Ibid., English ERN 0091-3513. "razdvajanje od druge dvije nacionalne zajednice, državno razdvajanje." BCS ERN 0214-9446.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., English ERN 0091-3552. "Prvi cilj je najvažniji i on je za sve ostale ciljeve, svi ostali ciljevi su potačke prvog. Jesmo li se opredjelili, da se konačno razgraničemo sa druge dvije nacionalne zajednice. Možemo se razdvojiti sa njima, ako se Bosna i Hercegovina pocijepa na troje." BCS ERN 0214-9476.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., English ERN 0091-3514. "Podela grada Sarajeva na srpski i muslimanski deo i uspostavljanje u svakom od ova dijela efektivne državne vlasti." BCS ERN 0214-9447.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., English ERN 0091-3514. "Sarajevo nam je, strateški gledano na petom mjestu, ali su borbe u Sarajevo i za Sarajevo, i strateški taktični gledano od presudne važnosti... Alija nema državu dok mi imamo dio Sarajeva. ... Borbe oko Sarajevo odlučuju sudbinu BiH i mi smo to i ranije slutili i o tome smo govorili, ako rata bude on će početi u Sarajevu i završiti u Sarajevu." BCS ERN 0214-9447.

¹¹⁷ For example, Bosnian Serb Assembly, 34th Session, 27 August 1993. BCS ERN 0215-0520. "Ova skupština je usvojila strateške ciljeve srpskog naroda koji su na izvjestan način postali naši zadaci, naša obaveza da ih ispunjavamo, ali to su bili strateški ciljevi kojima smo težili, kojima sad težimo da ih završimo kada bude to moguće."

¹¹⁸ "Zapisnik sa sastanak održanog u komandi 30.part.divizije, dana 12.05.1992.g., sa komandantima brigada i predsjednicima opština u zoni odgovornosti divizije" (Minutes of a meeting between the command of the First Partisan Brigade and the presidents of the municipalities in the division's responsibility zone), BCS ERN 0043-7691 – 0043-7694; English ERN 0110-6533 – 0110-6536.

¹¹⁹ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 42nd Session, 18-19 July 1994. BCS ERN 0215-2880 – 0215-2881. "Mi sasvim signurno znamo da moramo nešto da damo, to je van svake sumnje ukoliko hoćemo da ostvarimo prvi strateški cilj, a to je da se ratosiljamo neprijatelja iz kuće, a to je hrvata i muslimana da nebudemo više zajedno u državi."

¹²⁰ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 56th Session, 17 December 1995. BCS ERN 0215-4843. "Zadatak ove Republike i prvi strateški cilj da me se odvojimo od Muslimana i Hrvata i nema niko pravo da zasniva strategiju srpskog Sarajeva za ostanku u zajedničkoj državi. Tako da je isključena bilo kakva opasnost ili želja sa kopčem i rješenjem Sarajeva mi želimo da ostanemo sa Muslimanima i Hrvatima."

¹²¹ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 16th Session, 12 May 1992. English ERN 0091-3513. "Držimo sve svoje krajeve, sve opštine, sva naselja od Sarajeva i držimo naše neprijatelje, sad moram i mogu da kažem da držimo naše neprijatelje u potpunom okruženju, tako da im ne može da dođe vojna pomoć, ni u ljudstvu, ni u naoružanju." BCS ERN 0084-7722.

¹²² *Ibid.*, English ERN 0091-3520 - 0091-3521. "Mi smo spremni, mi držimo 50 km okruženja oko Ilijaša. Mi smo organizovani, i ja sam molio TV da dođe na snimi kako smo mi organizovani za rat u Ilijašu, kako je organizovana odbrana linije. Jest istina da smo mi pokrali dosta stvari. Imamo mi svega još dole na živimo. Mi smo pokrali 32 tona cisterne nafte i benzina. Mi smo presjekli i minirali prugu i nema više dolaska u Sarajevo. Mi smo minirali i auto-put. Sve ćemo učiniti da više neprimjetelj iz pravca Zenice u Sarajevo neće doći, a i odozgo ko pođe biće gotov." BCS ERN 0084-7728.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, English ERN 0091-3523. "We must keep hold of the airport for Serbian needs at all costs. ... If we let go of the airport, not only will we disappear from the lands on this side of the Drina river, we will disappear from the lands on this side of the Caucasus." "Aerodrom se mora sačuvati po svaku cijenu za potrebe Srba. ... Pustimo li mi aerodrom, ne da nas neće biti preko Drine, nego iza Kavkaza nas neće biti i vodimo računa o tome šta znaće takve činjenice." BCS ERN 0084-7730.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, English ERN 0091-3522. "Poznavajući ko nam je neprijatelj, u kojoj mjeri je on perfidan, i u kojoj mjeri mu se ne može vjerovati svaki dotle dok se on fizički, vojnički ne uništi i ne slomije, što podrazumijeva, naravno i eliminisanje i likvidaciju njegovih ključnih ljudi. Ja se odmah opredjeljujem za ovu prvu opciju, ratnu opciju jer jedino mislim da ... sudbina Srba u BiH za nas ovdje ne može drugačije riješiti već ratom." BCS ERN 0084-7729.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, English ERN 0091-3524. "Oni koji budu planirali operaciju Sarajeva, oslobadjanja Sarajeva ili uništenja žive neprijateljske sile u Sarajevo moraju da planiraju šta će sa zdravstvenim objektima. I odmah da vam kažem, ako će Vojna bolnica pasti u ruke neprijatelju, onda sam ja za to da se Koševska bolnica uništi i da neprijatelj nema gdje da se liječi." BCS ERN 0084-7731.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, English ERN 0091-3544. "I mi trebamo još ovog momenta u prsten staviti aždajinu glavu Sarajevo i iz njega može da ima izlaza samo onaj koja ćemo mi pustiti, a ne svaki od nas već onaj ko je glavnik, ko komanduje." BCS ERN 0084-7747.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, English ERNs 0091-3544 - 0091-3545. "Mi ne smijemo kazati, mi ćemo uništiti Sarajevo, ne mi nećemo, mi hoćemo da sačuvamo Sarajevo, nama Sarajevo treba. Mi nećemo kazati da ćemo srušiti dalekovod ili vodu isključiti, ne jer to Ameriku diže na noge, ali gospodo, mi vas molimo sve u redu, e, jednog dana nema vode u cijelom Sarajevu. ... Prema toma mi moramo mudro saopštiti svijetu, gađali su oni, pogodili dalekovod i nestalo struje, gađali vodovod, nestalo struje tu i tu, vršimo napore i popravljamo, to je ta diplomatija." BCS ERN 0084-7747.

¹²⁸ Radovan Karadžić, Open Letter to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, French President Francois Mitterrand, British Prime Minister John Major, Envoy Cyrus Vance, and Lord David Owen, 8 September 1992, in Radovan Karadžić, *Letters*, vol. 2 (Belgrade: Medjunarodni odbor za istinu o Radovanu Karadžiću, 2003), p. 107.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Nikola Ivanović, *Rečeno ili prećutano* (Mentioned or kept secret) (Belgrade: Književne novine – Enciklopedija, 1993), p. 481. Interview with Karadžić first published in *Pobjeda*, 8 June 1993. "Republika Srpska postoji. Njen glavni grad je Sarajevo, tj. srpsko Sarajevo, a u srpsko Sarajevo spadaju i Pale, jer su Pale sarajevska opština."

¹³¹ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. BCS ERN 0214-9561. "Kad su Srbi u Sarajevu digli ustanak i kad su uzeli određene teritorije pod svoju kontrolu, o tome momentu nije bilo Vlada ili se bar nije znalo gdje je. Čak šta više u prvim danima nismo znali da li je i gospodin Karadžić živ. Kada smo saznali da je živ i kad je sišao medju nas na Ilidža i dao nam određena ohrabrenja Srbi su u Sarajevo na tim prostorima zadržali određenu teritoriju pod kontrolom, a po nekim dijelovima i proširili svoje teritorija i potjerali muslimane sa teritorije gdje su oni praktično u većini."

¹³² Bosnian Serb Assembly, 34th Session, August 27, 1993, Karadžić, Prosecutor v Milošević, IT-02-54, Exhibit 538 ID, BCS ERN: 0215-0571. "sve što je srpsko u Sarajevo zadržaćemo. ... Jer nama Sarajevo integriše istočnu Hercegovinu, Staru Hercegovinu i Romaniju.... Romanija ima svoju čaršiju u Sarajevu. I tako će i ostati. ... Gradićemo policentrični razvoj i za takav razvoj nama je Srpsko Sarajevo od neprocjenjive važnost i nećemo ga dati."

¹³³ "The UN stated that the Swedes were fired upon until the Serb police chief of Ilidža came out and appealed to the gunmen to hold their fire. ... As dusk fell, hillside Serbian forces unleashed intense artillery, mortar and machinegun fire into downtown areas of the city." UN Commission of Experts, p. 165.

¹³⁴ *Oslobodjenje*, 28 April 1992, p. 1.

¹³⁵ When Serb forces began their bombardment on 2 May, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović was in Rome for negotiations with EC representatives. Although he was told that the Sarajevo airport was closed, he returned to the city by plane and was immediately detained by JNA forces holding the airport. In subsequent negotiations, the JNA agreed to release Izetbegović in exchange for General Kukanjac and hundreds of officers and soldiers then in the large military headquarters in the city center. Izetbegović and Kukanjac rode together in the same armored personnel carrier to coordinate the release, but ARBiH soldiers fired on the convoy, killing six persons. See the description in Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, pp. 233-242.

¹³⁶ In the words of General Kukanjac, "The attempt at revenge by the paramilitaries on 3 May 1992 was not successful." *NIN*, 6 January 2000, p. 57. At a press conference on 5 May 1992, Deputy Commander of the Bosnian TO, Colonel Vehbija Karić, announced that an effort by tanks and infantry to penetrate into the heart of the city on 3 May was repulsed and that TO forces had launched a counteroffensive. *Večernje Novine*, 6 May 1992, p. 2.

¹³⁷ Four excellent accounts of the diplomatic efforts for peace have appeared in print. A first-hand account is provided by (Lord) David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (London: V. Gollancz, 1995), an account of his day-to-day negotiations with the various parties. A valuable secondary work by two long-time scholars of the region is Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999). Two other works cover the same terrain: David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); and Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*.

¹³⁸ Bosnian Serb Assembly, 11th Session, 18 March 1992. Karadžić told the assembly, "The document has been accepted as a basis, as a foundation for further negotiations. The document has not been signed. We would never sign anything that we did not agree upon." English ERN 0190-4673.

¹³⁹ Mladen Klemenčič, "Territorial Proposals for the Settlement of the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina," ed. Martin Pratt and Clive Schofield, *International Boundaries Research Unit Boundary and Territory Briefing* 1 (3), 1994, p. 41.

¹⁴⁰ *New York Times*, 28 July 1992, p. A-3.

¹⁴¹ "Security Council Resolution 752 (1992) (S/RES/752, 15 May 1992)," Daniel Bethlehem and Marc Weller (eds.), *The 'Yugoslav' Crisis in International Law: General Issues (Part 1)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 8.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, I: 516. "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 752 (1992) (S/24000, 26 May 1992)," I: 516.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, I: 9-12.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, I: Resolutions 758 of 8 June 1992 (p. 12), 761 of 29 June 1992 (p. 13), 764 of 13 July 1992 (pp. 14-15), and 770 of 13 August 1992 (pp. 17-18).

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, I: 18, "Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) (S/RES/771, 13 August 1992)."

¹⁴⁶ "Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Commission resolution 1922/S 1/1 of 14 August 1992. Commission on Human Rights. Economic and Social Council, United Nations. 28 August 1992."

¹⁴⁷ The Oriental Institute, including its extensive archival holdings of documents pertaining to all Bosnian religious groups and nationalities, was totally destroyed on 17 May 1992. *Orijentalni institut u Sarajevu 1950. – 2000 (The Institute for Oriental Studies in Sarajevo 1950-2000)* (Sarajevo: Orijentalni institut, 2000), pp. 12 and 17.

¹⁴⁸ UN Commission of Experts, pp. 282-283.

¹⁴⁹ Tatjana Praštalo, "Death of a Library," *Logos*, 1997, pp. 96-99, and UN Commission of Experts, pp. 282-84.

¹⁵⁰ On the London Conference, see Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, pp. 211-214; Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, pp. 224-232; and Campbell, *National Deconstruction*, pp. 131-138.

¹⁵¹ *New York Times*, 28 August 1992, p. A-6.

¹⁵² *New York Times*, 29 August 1992, p. A-4.

¹⁵³ On the VOPP, see Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, pp. 214-250; and Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, pp. 89-149.

¹⁵⁴ Bethlehem and Weller (eds.), *The 'Yugoslav' Crisis in International Law*, UNSCR 819, 16 April 1993, Paragraph 6.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Resolution 824, 6 May 1993, Preface and Paragraph 4 (a).

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Resolution 836, 4 June 1993, Paragraph 5.

¹⁵⁷ Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, pp. 255-259.

¹⁵⁸ On the Union of Three Republics plan, see Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, pp. 271-281; and Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, pp. 185-222.

¹⁵⁹ On the EU Action Plan, see Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, pp. 281-286, and Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, pp. 223-254.

¹⁶⁰ Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, p. 190.

¹⁶¹ On the Washington Agreement, see Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, pp. 292-298; and Campbell, *National Deconstruction*, pp. 149-151.

¹⁶² On the Contact Group and its various plans, see Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, pp. 298-314; and Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, pp. 255-292.

APPENDIX A

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Sarajevo: A Biography. London: Hurst, and Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006.

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- University of Michigan. Visiting Professor of History (Fall 2004 and Fall 2005).
- University of Michigan. Helen DeRoy Visiting Professor in Honors (Fall 2003).
- Merrill Lynch. Financial Consultant and Branch Manager. Houston, Texas (1981-87); San Diego, California (1987-90); Amarillo, Texas (1990-91); Fort Worth, Texas (1992-1995); and La Jolla, California (1995-2000). Retirement in 2000.
- The University of Oregon. Russian and East European Studies Center. Visiting Assistant Professor of History. 1980 - 1981.
- The Ohio State University Lima Campus. Assistant Professor of History. 1978 - 1980.
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The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, June – July 1997; *The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez*, July 1999; *The Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al. ("Omarska")*,

Submission of March 2001; *The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić et al. ("Bosanski Šamac")*, September 2001; *The Prosecutor v. Radislav Brđjanin and Momir Talić ("Autonomous Region of Krajina")*, March 2002; *The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić ("Sarajevo")*, April 2002; *The Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić ("Prijedor")*, April 2002; *The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević*, September and November 2003; and *The Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik*, July 2005, *The Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al.*, May 2006.

Expert witness testimony regarding the historical background and context of alleged war crimes.

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Appendix B

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Table One
Population of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo by National Identity, 1991

	Croat		Muslim		Serb		Yugoslav		"Other"		Total
BiH	760,852	17.4%	1,902,956	43.5%	1,366,104	31.2%	242,682	5.5%	104,439	2.4%	4,377,033
Sarajevo	34,873	6.6%	259,470	49.2%	157,143	29.8%	56,470	10.7%	19,093	3.6%	527,049

Source: Croatia, Drzavni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske. *Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine: Narodni sastav po naseljima* (The population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. National composition by municipality), Zagreb: Državni zavod za statistiku, 1995, p. 15.

Table Two**Delegates in Bosnian Assembly and in Sarajevo City Council by Party, 1991**

	SDA (Muslim)	SDS (Serb)	HDZ (Croat)	Social Democrats	Reformists	Other	Total
Bosnian Assembly	86 (35.8%)	72 (30.0%)	44 (18.3%)	20 (8.3%)	18 (7.5%)		240
Sarajevo City Council	41 (34.2%)	28 (23.3%)	4 (3.3%)	22 (18.3%)	19 (15.8%)	6 (5%)	120

Source:

Appendix C

